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On a stock’s ex-dividend day, we should expect to see its price drop by the 
amount of the dividend.  If the stock were to be sold before that day, the seller would 
relinquish to the buyer the right to receive the dividend.  After the stock goes ex-
dividend, however, the right to the dividend remains with the seller and is not transferred 
to the buyer.  Ignoring the time value of money in the short period between the ex-date 
and the dividend payment date (usually 2-4 weeks), the stock price must drop by the 
value of the dividend to prevent arbitrage.
However, much empirical research has documented that stock prices drop by 
significantly less than the dividend on the ex -day.  The first explanation for this effect 
[Elton and Gruber (EG 1970)] cited preferential tax treatment of capital gains.  
Specifically, when dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, investors would 
not be willing to subject themselves to higher tax rates by holding a stock through the ex-
dividend day unless they were compensated by a smaller ex-day price decline.  However, 
there has not been unanimous agreement about whether ex-dividend stock price behavior 
is truly driven by differential taxation of dividends and capital gains.  Other arguments 
[e.g., Kalay (1982)] point out that short-term traders are taxed identically on dividends 
and capital gains, so any deviation from a one-for-one price drop-to-dividend relationship 
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creates an apparent arbitrage opportunity if transaction costs are low enough.  However, 
if higher transaction costs inhibit “dividend capture” activity, the ex-day effect 
hypothesized by EG may still persist.
More recent explanations for the ex-day effect point to different aspects of market 
microstructure.  One of the interesting microstructure models is that of Bali and Hite 
(1998).  They argue that when dividends may be paid in any amount but stock prices are 
constrained to discrete multiples of 12.5 cents, ex-day prices should drop by the largest 
tick multiple less than the dividend, regardless of tax considerations.  Recent events have 
provided an excellent opportunity to test the discreteness hypothesis, as the major 
exchanges converted to “decimalized” pricing in 2001, thereby removing the supposed 
cause for the effect.  Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003) and Jakob and Ma (2004) 
find that the ex-day effect continues to exist even in the absence of large discrete price 
increments, thereby casting serious doubt on the explanatory power of the discreteness 
model.
The ex-day pricing problem has endured as a subject of interest in financial 
economics for several reasons.  First, ex-day pricing ultimately suggests something about 
how stockholders value dividends versus capital gains, which has implications for 
corporate dividend policy (assuming managers maximize shareholder wealth).  Next, 
with improved knowledge of the determinants of ex-day pricing, all market participants 
can make better decisions, either by timing transactions or by engaging in other profitable 
trading activities around the ex-day.  Finally, the ex-day phenomenon is an anomaly with 
implications for market efficiency, and such anomalies naturally call for an explanation.
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This study focuses almost exclusively on tax-based explanations for ex-dividend 
stock price behavior.  Tax law changes provide an obvious opportunity to test theories 
about the effects of taxation, including those specifically related to ex-day pricing.  
Indeed, many past studies have done this to some extent.  The next chapter cites at least 
13 different works that examine the ex-day phenomenon before and after a U.S. tax 
reform.  However, single-reform studies are limited to a relatively narrow time interval 
and are unable to consider jointly the behavior of ex-day prices under multiple tax 
regimes.
Tax rates on dividends and capital gains have varied considerably over the past 
century – certainly enough to conduct a good test of the EG model – yet few studies to 
date have examined the variation in ex-dividend stock price behavior over a substantial 
period of time.  Probably the most noteworthy exception is Eades, Hess, and Kim (EHK 
1994), who plot the time series of abnormal ex-day returns (scaled by a volatility 
estimate) from 1962-1989.  In their regressions, EHK mostly fail to find a significant 
relationship between ex-day returns and changes in taxation.  However, this may be 
because they attempt to measure the impact of taxes using only dummy variables for a 
select handful of tax reforms.  Dummy variables cannot capture the broad spectrum of tax 
rates across multiple tax law changes; they can only indicate whether or not a given 
regime is in effect.  Thus, the results of EHK do not necessarily imply that ex-dividend 
stock price behavior is unrelated to tax changes through time – only that when the 
particular tax laws studied were in effect, no significant differences in ex-day returns 
were detected versus when the laws were not in effect.
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More recently, Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (NNR 2000) employ a 
slightly different methodology that relates ex-day returns to tax rates instead of dummy 
variables.  Consequently, a 30 percent tax rate in one year is treated the same as a 30 
percent rate in another year, even if they occur under different tax “regimes.”  Unlike 
EHK, NNR find that taxes do influence ex-day returns.  However, this conclusion is 
based only on corporate tax rates after the elimination of fixed commissions on 1 May 
1975, and it applies only to a carefully filtered sample of high dividend yield securities 
that are likely to be targets of corporate dividend capture.
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways.  First, unlike 
almost every other study of ex-day pricing (except NNR), we recognize that some tax law 
changes are larger than others, so we use variables that are calculated from the rates
themselves.  Information about the magnitude of a tax law change is unfortunately lost in 
simple “before and after” comparisons or when a broad spectrum of tax rates is reduced 
to a binary variable that only indicates whether a given change has or has not occurred.
Our approach allows for meaningful comparisons of price changes around ex-dates in 
multiple time periods.  However, unlike NNR, we do not restrict our attention to high-
yield corporate dividend capture targets.  Lower-yield securities (which are by far the 
majority) are more likely to be held by individual investors, so a completely different set 
of tax rates may apply to them.
Second, we consider a longer time period incorporating more tax law changes 
than any prior ex-day study.  While we are able to look 14 years past the end of the EHK 
sample period, a more interesting aspect of our study is that we also consider much older
data.  Since there is no readily available source of daily stock price data before 1962, 
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most studies do not look at ex-day pricing in that era.  While this is understandable, it is 
unfortunate because the 1940s and 1950s saw the highest personal tax rates (and largest 
differentials between dividends and capital gains) ever to occur in U.S. history.  If 
differential taxation really is the cause of the ex-day anomaly, it should be evident in 
approximately the two decades preceding 1962.  The first half of the twentieth century 
also witnessed some very large changes in tax rates.  For example, the individual 
maximum ordinary rate was hiked from 25 to 63 percent in 1932 and from 15 to 67 
percent in 1917.  Regrettably, we cannot hand-collect price information around all
dividend ex-dates before 1962.  Therefore, we limit our sample to the stocks in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average. The Dow sample is a convenient choice since an active market
ensures that accurate price information is usually available.
Finally, we consider the effect of recent stock price performance on ex-day 
pricing.  Elton and Gruber (1970) assume that an investor must sell either immediately 
before or immediately after the dividend distribution, realizing the tax consequences 
immediately.  In reality, stockholders have at least one more choice – specifically, to 
receive the dividend and continue holding the stock for some time.  As a rule, taxpayers 
prefer to postpone the recognition of income and accelerate the recognition of losses.  
Therefore, if the stock has appreciated significantly since the investor bought it, the tax 
benefits from deferring capital gains into the future may outweigh the cost of paying a 
higher tax rate on a relatively small dividend.  Of course, if the stock’s value has declined 
significantly since it was purchased, the investor may be more eager to sell it to lock in a 
tax deduction if he or she has not already done so.  As far as we know, this aspect of 
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taxation and its effect on ex-dividend stock price behavior has not been satisfactorily 
addressed in the literature.
The rest of this work proceeds as follows.  The next chapter outlines the literature 
documenting the existence of the ex-day phenomenon, the theories that have been put 
forward to explain it, and the evidence supporting or refuting these ideas.  Chapter 3 
provides a brief narrative of important tax law changes over the past century.  In Chapter 
4, we make testable predictions based on several alternative models of ex-dividend stock 
price behavior.  We begin with the classic EG model but expand it to account for the 
influence of recent stock price performance on ex-day trading, as well as investors’ 
abilities to anticipate future tax law changes.  Chapter 5 describes our data and the key 
variables used in this study, explains the methodology for each of our empirical tests, and 
compares the results with our ex ante predictions.  Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
2.1 Tax-Based Dividend Clienteles and Short-Term Trading
2.1.1 Early Studies
In one of the earliest published studies on the ex-day anomaly, Campbell and 
Beranek (1955) observed that the ex-dividend price drop was on average slightly less 
than the dividend (≈ 90%) for a small sample of medium-sized to large cash distributions 
paid on NYSE stocks.  While they do note that “a tax-paying individual will do better to 
sell before an ex-dividend date but to buy after it,” and that “[f]or a tax-exempt 
institution, the rule is exactly the reverse,” they do not attempt to give a formal 
explanation for why the price should not normally drop by the full dividend amount.
Several years later, Miller and Modigliani (1961) published their seminal piece on 
dividend policy, in which they first proposed the idea of dividend clienteles.  They argued 
that while dividend policy decisions neither enhance nor destroy corporate value (thus, 
their famous “dividend irrelevance” proposition), it is possible that capital market 
imperfections could cause different investors to prefer different payout policies, so that 
firms with similar dividend yields would tend to attract a “clientele” favoring that 
particular policy.
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Using a one-year sample with 4,148 dividends, Elton and Gruber (EG 1970) 
confirm that ex-day stock prices tend to fall by significantly less than the dividend and 
develop a model explaining the effect.  They show that when dividends are taxed at a 
higher rate than capital gains, the stock price must drop by less than the dividend for 
investors to be indifferent between (i) selling the stock cum-dividend (i.e. before the 
distribution) and (ii) holding the stock, receiving the dividend, and selling ex-dividend.  
Specifically, the relationship is given by












where Pcum is the last cum-dividend price, Pex is the first ex-dividend price, D is the 
dividend amount, td is the tax rate applied to dividend income, and tcg is the tax rate 
applied to capital gains.  (See Chapter 4 for a complete derivation.)  It follows that 
PDR < 1 when tcg < td, as the rates have frequently been for individual investors.  EG sort
their sample into deciles by dividend yield and compute the mean PDR for each group.  
Using the equation above, EG then impute investors’ marginal tax rates for each dividend 
yield decile.  They find that PDRs generally increase with dividend yield, suggesting that 
investors in lower tax brackets prefer stocks with higher dividend yields, while higher-
bracket investors prefer lower-yield stocks.  Thus, EG confirm the existence of the ex-
day effect, derive a mathematical model tying the effect and its magnitude to tax rates, 
and provide economic reasoning for a specific type of “dividend clientele” as suggested 
generally by Miller and Modigliani (1961).
The size of the ex-day effect documented by EG is actually somewhat larger than 
had been previously documented by Campbell and Beranek (1955) and Durand and May 
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(1960).  However, this is exactly what the EG tax theory would predict since both earlier 
studies used samples of stocks with higher dividend yields.1
2.1.2 Short-Term Trading and Transaction Costs
Critics of the tax theory have noted that preferential tax treatment of capital gains 
over dividends applies only to long-term individual investors.  Corporations historically 
have been allowed to exclude 70 to 85 percent of dividends received from taxable 
income, thereby reducing their effective dividend tax rates below the capital gains rate.  
Other investors, such as short-term traders and tax-exempt funds, are taxed (or not taxed) 
identically on dividends and capital gains and thus should be indifferent between the two 
types of income.  In fact, short-term arbitrageurs should exploit any difference between 
the dividend and the ex-day price drop until the two are approximately equal, with any 
remaining random discrepancies due to market imperfections.  [See Brooks and Edwards 
(1980), Kalay (1982), Miller and Scholes (1982), and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) 
for arguments advocating this position.]  This reasoning is compelling, and it casts doubt 
on the validity of marginal tax rates inferred from the EG model.2
Kalay (1982) revisits the original EG study using a slightly different methodology 
for the same sample period to correct for potential biases.  Interestingly, even after the 
adjustments, he still affirms EG’s basic findings that ∆P/D is on average less than 1 and 
1 Campbell and Beranek (1955) restrict their sample to dividends ranging from $0.375 up to $2.00 per 
share, in increments of $0.125.  Durand and May (1960) use a sample of 43 AT&T dividends of $2.25 each 
and find an insignificant effect (PDR ≈ 95%).  Presently most dividends are less than $0.25 per share. 
2 Interestingly, Michaely and Vila (1995) develop a theoretical model showing that investors’ marginal tax 
rates can be inferred using ex-day price and volume information together. 
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positively related to the dividend yield.  [For further discussion on these two studies, see 
Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1984) and Kalay (1984).3]
In view of the above arguments, the persistence of abnormal ex-day returns is at 
first puzzling.  After all, it seems that anything but a one-for-one price drop creates a 
virtual arbitrage opportunity.  On the other hand, there is little doubt that positive ex-day 
returns do happen, as documented by countless studies, many of which are cited later in 
this review.  Of course, negative ex-day returns (where the price drops by more than the 
dividend) are well-documented, too – usually in stocks with the highest dividend yields.  
High-yield stocks are often attractive targets for “dividend capture” by corporations who 
are generally taxed much less on dividends than on capital gains.  Upon further reflection, 
it should also be puzzling if the tax preferences of long-term investors do not influence 
stock prices around the ex-dividend date.  
It might seem, then, that the EG model of tax-based dividend clienteles is in 
competition with the short-term trading hypothesis, and that the focus of empirical tests 
should be to determine which one better describes observed price behavior.  It would be a 
mistake, however, to view the two hypotheses only as separate, opposing stories.  In fact, 
they can be complementary, as different classes of traders may coexist, and all may 
influence the supply of and demand for securities around the ex-date.  Boyd and 
Jagannathan (1994) develop a theoretical model that explicitly models the tax 
heterogeneity brought about by interaction among different types of market participants.  
Their model predicts a nonlinear relationship (for which they find some evidence in their 
3 Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1984) argue that Kalay (1982) underestimates transaction costs that would 
hinder short-term trading.  Kalay (1984) agrees but maintains that transaction costs are not always 
prohibitive.
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data) between the percentage price drop (∆P/P) and the dividend yield.  It also shows that 
when the dividend yield is high enough, corporate dividend capturers have a trading 
advantage over tax-neutral arbitrageurs, thus explaining why PDRs are often greater than 
one for high-yield stocks.  In the same spirit, Michaely and Vila (1995, 1996) develop a 
model and provide empirical evidence suggesting that abnormally high ex-day trading 
volume occurs precisely because of the abovementioned tax heterogeneity.  They also 
note that “because of the risk involved [in dividend capture strategies], no traders will 
take an unlimited position, regardless of the price movement.”  Thus, ex-day abnormal 
returns do not necessarily imply that arbitrageurs are not at work; instead, they may have 
taken the largest possible positions that their tolerances for risk will allow.
The tax heterogeneity framework suggests that positive ex-day returns may exist 
for some stocks, but those returns are likely to vanish (or even become negative) when 
the dividend yield is high enough, the risk small enough, and/or transaction costs low 
enough to attract arbitrageurs or even corporate dividend capturers.  Consistent with this 
view, Karpoff and Walkling (1990) find for a sample of NASDAQ stocks that ex-day 
returns were positively related to transaction costs as measured by bid-ask spreads, 
especially for high-yield stocks.  Michaely and Vila (1995, 1996) find evidence that 
abnormal ex-day trading volume was greater for high-yield stocks, lower for riskier 
stocks, and higher when options could be used to hedge a risky dividend capture position.  
In May 1975, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) switched from a fixed commission 
system to negotiated commissions, a move that is widely agreed to have reduced 
transaction costs.  Consistent with the integrated tax clientele/short-term trading 
framework, studies generally find lower ex-day returns and higher trading volume after 
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the introduction of negotiated commissions, particularly for higher-yield stocks with 
lower measured transaction costs proxies.  [See Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), 
Karpoff and Walkling (1988), Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984, 1994), and Naranjo, 
Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (2000).]
2.1.3 Other Securities and Non-Taxable Distributions
While most ex-day pricing research has focused on taxable cash dividends on 
common stocks, one can also make inferences about existing theories by observing the 
price behavior of different securities and around other distribution types.  Eades, Hess, 
and Kim (1984) document negative excess returns for preferred dividends, as might be 
expected for high-yield dividend capture targets.  However, Stickel (1991) obtains 
conflicting results.  In his sample of nonconvertible preferreds, he finds positive 
abnormal returns and volume on the ex-day, with returns declining for more liquid 
stocks.  So far, this is consistent with a synthesized model where both long-term investors 
and short-term arbitrageurs influence prices around preferred dividends.  Inconsistent 
with this framework, however, is Stickel’s finding that trading volume increases with 
liquidity for low-yield but not high-yield preferreds.
Preferred dividends are of course relevant to ex-day pricing theories, but it is 
perhaps more interesting to compare observations around non-taxable distributions 
against those around the usual taxable dividends.  Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) and 
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) examine ex-day price behavior around stock 
dividends and splits, which are non-taxable.  According to both the EG model and the 
short-term trading hypothesis, these studies should find ex-day price drops fully reflective 
13
of the dilution caused by additional shares.  In fact, neither does.  Eades et al. report that 
“non-taxable stock dividends and splits are priced on ex-dividend days as if they are fully 
taxable.” Oddly, Grinblatt et al. note higher positive ex-day returns for stock dividends
than splits, possibly due to the added inconvenience investors face when dealing with odd 
lots.
Green and Rydqvist (1999) study a unique security – Swedish lottery bonds – to 
which special rules apply.   Coupon payments on the bonds (distributed by lottery) are 
not subject to income tax, but capital gains are taxed at the ordinary rate.  Furthermore, 
the regulatory environment is not conducive to short-term arbitrage using these securities.  
Consistent with the EG tax model, Green and Rydqvist find that the bond price drops by 
about 130 percent of the distribution on the “ex-coupon” day, and that the bonds 
frequently trade at negative pre-tax yields.  
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) examine two samples of closed-end funds.  In 
one sample, distributions are not taxed (but capital gains are); in the other, distributions 
are taxed normally.  As expected, market-adjusted price drop ratios are greater than one 
for the non-taxable distributions but less than one for the taxable sample.  Price drop 
ratios for both samples also behave as predicted by the EG model following tax law 
changes in 1993 and 1997.  Similarly, Milonas, Travlos, Xiao, and Tan (2002) examine 
taxable and non-taxable dividends in the Chinese stock market and find price behavior 
mostly consistent with the tax theory.
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2.1.4 Alternative Regulatory and Tax Environments
While U.S. markets generally provide ample opportunity to test asset pricing 
models, international markets offer researchers the chance to reexamine theories in 
environments where institutional details and tax laws are sometimes very different.  For 
example, Milonas and Travlos (2001) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998) show that the 
ex-day phenomenon still exists for securities traded in Athens and Hong Kong, 
respectively, despite the absence of both dividend and capital gains taxes in each case.  
Consistent with the tax heterogeneity framework, however, Kadapakkam (2000) notes 
that abnormal ex-day returns dropped to insignificant levels, while trading volume 
increased, almost immediately after the Hong Kong market abandoned a cumbersome 
physical settlement procedure that could take 21 days to complete in favor of a more 
efficient electronic procedure that better facilitated short-term trading.  Not surprisingly, 
the change was most pronounced for high-yield stocks.
Japanese markets are unique in ex-day pricing research, as the dividend amount is 
not usually known before the ex-date, which is often very close to the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year (usually in March).  Hayashi and Jagannathan (1990) find that stock prices 
actually rise on the ex -dividend day due to “unidentified shocks.”  Kato and Loewenstein 
(1995) confirm these results and find excess returns on the ex-day large enough for even 
small traders to exploit.  Both studies confirm that the results depend on whether the ex-
day is near a fiscal year-end, and Kato and Loewenstein believe that tax effects are only 
of secondary importance in the case of Japan.
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2.1.5 Effect of Tax Law Changes
Although a complete understanding of the determinants of ex-dividend stock price 
behavior still eludes us, the essence of the best-known and most enduring of all theories 
is that different tax rates cause investors to value dividends and capital gains unequally.  
The works cited previously employ a wide variety of methodologies that have furthered 
our understanding, but there are few better opportunities to test theories about taxes than 
the natural experiment created by changes in a country’s tax laws.  Therefore, the 
remainder of this subsection reviews most of the important works that have considered 
one or more tax law changes, whether in the U.S. or abroad.  We then discuss some of 
their strengths and weaknesses, along with how this study advances knowledge in the
area.
We begin with Barclay (1987), who documents ex-day price behavior before and 
after the introduction of the Federal Income Tax in 1913.  Using data from the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Barclay finds that ∆P/D is not only close to one 
but also stable across groups when stocks are sorted into quintiles by dividend yield.  In a 
matched sample from the post-income tax era, ∆P/D is less than one and generally 
increases with dividend yield.  These findings are clearly consistent with EG.  While its 
uniqueness makes Barclay’s study extremely interesting, it does have one notable 
drawback.  Specifically, his post-tax matched sample is drawn from the period 1962-
1985.  Although the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database makes it 
much easier to obtain these later prices, one cannot help but wonder how ex-day prices 
behaved immediately following 1913.
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Grammatikos (1989) examined ex-day price behavior before and after the Tax 
Reform Act (TRA) of 1984.  The 1984 Act lengthened the time a corporation must hold 
the stock “at risk” from 16 to 46 days.  If the corporation does not meet the minimum 
holding requirement, the dividend becomes ineligible for the intercorporate dividend 
exclusion and is instead taxed at the normal rate, thus eliminating the motivation for 
dividend capture altogether. Consistent with the added risk imposed on dividend 
capturers, ex-day returns rose on average after the Act, but not so much for stocks that 
could be hedged with options.
Of all U.S. tax law changes, none has been more thoroughly researched with 
respect to its effect on ex-day pricing than the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA).  The 1986 
Act lowered ordinary personal and corporate income tax rates but eliminated preferential 
tax treatment of long-term capital gains.  According to the EG model, either of these two 
changes should cause ∆P/D to rise (and ex-day returns to fall), and indeed most empirical 
investigations [e.g. Robin (1991), Lamdin and Hiemstra (1993), Koski (1996)] support 
this prediction.  Probably the most notable dissenter is Michaely (1991), who finds that 
∆P/D is not significantly different from one in any of the years 1986-1989 around the 
TRA, leading him to conclude that short-term traders are much more active now than in 
the time period studied by EG.  However, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1999) point out that 
Michaely’s estimates may have been distorted by outliers.  They are able to replicate his 
results, but after filtering out a small number of observations with other simultaneous 
distributions, excessively large positive or negative price drop ratios, and/or missing 
bid/ask prices on the cum- or ex-day, they find that ∆P/D in 1986 (i.e. before the TRA 
took effect) was on average less than one, positively correlated with the dividend yield, 
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and negatively related to transaction costs – consistent with the integrated tax framework.  
Han’s (1994) results are mixed, as ex-day excess returns fall post-1986 for his NASDAQ 
sample but not for NYSE/AMEX securities.  Finally, it is also worth pointing out that the 
1986 TRA decreased tax heterogeneity, as it caused long-term investors and would-be 
arbitrageurs to view dividends and capital gains similarly.  Michaely and Vila (1995) and 
Wu and Hsu (1996) support the general consensus that ex-day returns dropped following 
the 1986 reform, but consistent with prior arguments, they also find a significant 
reduction in ex-day volume as decreased heterogeneity reduced the incentive to trade.
Of course, studies of tax reforms need not be confined to the U.S.  Tax law 
changes in the United Kingdom (UK) have provided several excellent opportunities to 
test the basic tax clientele model, and the evidence has been mostly supportive.  While 
Poterba and Summers (1984) do not find a notable change in ex-day returns following the
introduction of a capital gains tax in 1965, they do find a substantial drop following a 
1973 reduction in the effective tax rate on dividends.  Lasfer (1995) finds that ex-day 
returns decline following the 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, which reduced the 
differential taxation of dividends and capital gains (similar to the 1986 TRA in the U.S.).  
Bell and Jenkinson (2002) study ex-day returns 30 months before and after the 1997 
Finance Act (FA97), which removed pension funds’ preference for dividends over capital 
gains.  Price drop ratios fell and ex-day returns rose following FA97, especially for high-
yield stocks, implying not only that taxes affect valuation but also that pension funds are 
the likely marginal investors for the securities used in the study.
While the UK evidence has been mostly compatible with EG, results from 
Canadian tax reforms have been less so.  In spite of a 1971 tax law change that increased 
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the value of dividends relative to capital gains, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) find 
lower price drop ratios for securities on the Toronto Stock Exchange, which they attribute 
to another provision of the tax reform that reduces short-term trader profits.  A recent 
working paper by Bauer, Beveridge, and Sivakumar (2002) considers a 1990 change in 
the relative taxation of capital gains and dividends on Canadian stocks, but similarly finds 
no support for the tax theory.  In a sample period (1970-1980) covering four different tax 
regimes, Booth and Johnston (1984) find that ∆P/D is consistently less than one.  
However, they are unable to draw conclusions in favor of the tax model because PDR 
does not increase with dividend yield as hypothesized.
We now turn our attention back to studies that employ U.S. data.  While there is 
no shortage of papers covering the impact of a single reform, the ex-day phenomenon has 
rarely been examined over long periods of time with the intention of understanding how 
ex-dividend price behavior varies with multiple changes in taxation.  The earliest 
example we were able to find is Skinner (1993), who considers ten personal tax law 
changes over a 25-year period beginning in 1963.  On average, ∆P/D is found to be less 
than one, the notable exception being utility stocks after 1972, which have price drop 
ratios higher than one.  This exception is not surprising because utility stocks are often 
suitable candidates for corporate dividend capture, and the latter part of Skinner’s sample 
period corresponds roughly to the era following the introduction of negotiable 
commissions on the NYSE.  Dividend capture was arguably more profitable in this era 
since transaction costs were lower under negotiated commissions.  In separate regressions 
performed around each tax law change individually, ∆P/D is found to increase with a 
stock’s dividend yield and decrease with its estimated beta, again consistent with a 
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synthesized tax/short-term trading framework.  Unfortunately, the dummy variables for 
each tax law change (equal to zero before the change and one afterward) are rarely 
significant in the predicted direction, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.
The most comprehensive paper to date addressing the time series of ex-dividend 
stock price behavior is Eades, Hess, and Kim (EHK 1994).  Instead of calculating 
average price drop ratios, which can be distorted by very small dividends, EHK use 






where RPi is the return on a portfolio of the stocks going ex-dividend on day i, µi is the 
return on a portfolio of “non-ex-day” stocks, and σi is the estimated volatility of day i’s 
ex-dividend portfolio.  Consistent with prior literature, SERs are positive over the sample 
period (1962-1989) for all dividend-paying stocks, and especially so for the lower-yield 
subsample (comprised of their bottom three dividend yield quintiles).  However, their 
highest-yield quintile exhibited mostly negative ex-day returns after the introduction of 
negotiated commissions on the NYSE in 1975.  This is consistent with the idea that 
corporations – for whom dividend income receives preferential tax treatment – engage in 
dividend capture around the ex-date when transaction costs are not prohibitive.  [Recall 
Boyd and Jagannathan’s (1994) model which demonstrates that corporate dividend 
capturers, not arbitrageurs, may be the marginal price setters for the highest-yield stocks.]  
EHK are not able to find a consistent relationship between SERs and changes in taxation.  
However, some of their findings are at least consistent with tax clientele models.  First, 
SERs are negatively related to dividend yield within the high-yield subsample.  Second, 
for their overall and low-yield samples, EHK report negative coefficients on a dummy 
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variable for the time period from January 1977 to June 1984, when a longer holding 
period requirement for personal long-term capital gains was in effect.  This is to be 
expected since such restrictions make it more difficult for individual investors to get a 
lower tax rate on capital gains – the very reason for the ex-day effect according to EG.
More recently, Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (NNR 2000) extend EHK, 
focusing exclusively on high-yield stocks that are the most likely targets for corporate 
dividend capture.  Specifically, NNR include certain high-yield utility stocks (CRSP 
distribution code 1239) previously missed by EHK, while restricting the sample to  
domestic corporations (CRSP incorporation codes 10-11) to avoid dividends that are 
ineligible for the intercorporate exclusion and therefore unsuitable for capture.  After 
refining the sample selection procedure, they find mostly positive SERs before the switch 
to negotiated commissions (1963-1974) and persistently negative SERs after (1975-
1994).  NNR then use several weighted least squares regressions to determine what 
variables affect high-yield ex-day excess returns in the negotiated commission era.  






where θ is the intercorporate dividend exclusion percentage and tcorp is the ordinary 
corporate tax rate.  Consistent with the basic tax model, the estimated tax differential 
coefficient was always negative, either by itself or multiplied by the dividend yield.
2.1.6 Discussion
We affirm the importance of single-tax-reform works.  Researchers should 
continue to conduct “before and after” analyses of future tax law changes to help validate 
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or refute tax-related theories.  Considering these studies together as part of the “big 
picture” helps us form an understanding about the effects of taxation.  However, when a 
long time series of data spanning multiple tax regimes is available, it makes sense to use 
as much information as possible in order to conduct a truly comprehensive test of the 
theory.
This is particularly true in the case of the ex-day phenomenon, where large stock 
price movements unrelated to the dividend create a high noise-to-signal ratio, making it 
hard to draw inferences about the effect of the dividend itself.  When considering only a 
few years before and after a particular tax reform, there is always the danger that overall 
stock market performance will be very different across the two periods.  To be fair, most 
ex-day studies we have seen attempt to control for this by adjusting for the market return 
on the ex-day.  Nevertheless, a significant level of idiosyncratic risk remains, as 
evidenced by observed fluctuations in market-adjusted price drop ratios and excess 
returns from one year to the next.
Very little is constant when it comes to taxation in the United States.  There has 
been considerable variation in both personal and corporate tax rates throughout the 20th
century – more than enough to conduct a good test of tax-related ex-day pricing theories.  
As discussed in the section above, at least three studies have attempted this to some 
extent, with different approaches and mixed results.  Skinner (1993) does well to consider 
ten different personal tax law changes.  However, he runs regressions separately for each 
one, using a dummy variable equal to zero for the regime immediately preceding the tax 
law change and one immediately following.  Effectively, then, this could be viewed as 
ten single-reform studies reported side by side.  If the relative taxation of dividends 
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versus capital gains were captured in one variable computed in all regimes, a single 
regression could be run for the whole sample period, thereby enabling more powerful 
tests.  EHK (1994) include as many as three personal tax law dummies simultaneously in 
their regressions.  However, a potential problem here is that many more tax law changes 
occurred during their sample period but were never considered.  EHK themselves admit 
that this aspect of their methodology may be an oversimplification (p. 1625).  
One of the problems in both of these studies is the use of dummy variables as the 
sole measurement of tax law changes.  A dummy variable can indicate whether a given 
tax regime is in effect, but it cannot capture the magnitude of a given tax reform in 
relation to another, nor can it compare the relative tax treatment of capital gains and 
dividends in multiple regimes.  The only study to use a “tax differential” variable 
comparable across all periods is NNR (2000).  They make an excellent case for corporate 
dividend capture in high-yield stocks and present convincing evidence that ex-day returns 
are significantly related to corporate taxation under negotiable commissions.  However, 
there is more work to be done.  Theory suggests that individual income tax laws should 
affect ex-day pricing for lower-yield stocks (and perhaps even higher-yield stocks in the 
fixed-commission era), but as far as we can tell, no truly satisfactory, comprehensive test 
of this important prediction has ever been conducted.
Neither EHK nor NNR plot price drop ratios due to problems with 
heteroskedasticity.  Given a certain price fluctuation, smaller dividends inflate the PDR, 
with the very smallest dividends potentially creating extreme values.  For this reason, 
many studies exclude the smallest dividends when calculating average price drop ratios.  
However, EHK also contend that price changes on the same day are correlated.  This 
23
should not be a problem if ex-day price changes are adjusted relative to the market, so 
that only firm-specific fluctuations remain.  Nevertheless, they treat each group of stocks 
going ex-dividend on the same day as a single observation and then plot only average 
SERs for those portfolios over time.  However, the SER statistic suffers from the problem 
that stocks are not counted equally.  Specifically, a stock would be weighted more 
heavily if it went ex-dividend on a day by itself, rather than going ex-dividend the same 
day as 30 other stocks.  Unfortunately, we know of no perfect test statistic, so we report 
the information conveyed by both PDRs and ex-day returns through time.
One other limitation with the three studies discussed above is the availability of 
data.  Tax laws have been changing for almost 100 years now.  However, CRSP daily 
stock price data begins in 1962, so most sample periods do not go back further. This is 
unfortunate because some very significant tax law changes happened before 1962, as will 
be outlined in Chapter 3.  Hand-collecting data from the Wall Street Journal on all stocks 
going ex-dividend before 1962 would be prohibitively time-consuming; however, the 
task becomes feasible if we limit ourselves to the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average.  An advantage to this particular subset of securities is that they are generally 
more heavily traded, so price quotations are more meaningful.  Therefore, results are 
reported separately for the Dow stocks back to 1910.  We are also able to cover important 
tax law changes from 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2003 that occurred too late to be considered 
by NNR.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In summary, our study of the effects of taxation on ex-dividend stock price 
behavior builds upon existing research in several ways.  First, we consider all changes in 
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tax rates simultaneously over a broad sample period, using a tax variable that is 
comparable across multiple regimes.  Second, we also consider important recent tax law 
changes that occurred after the end of NNR’s sample period, and (on a limited 
subsample) tax regimes before 1962 that have never been examined.  As illustrated in 
Figure 1, our sample period is much longer than that of any prior study.  Next, we 
consider the impact of both personal and corporate tax rates on high- and low-yield 
stocks, whereas prior studies tend to ignore one set of securities and/or tax rates.  Finally, 
we recognize that all ex-day price performance measures have inherent advantages and 
shortcomings, so we do not rely solely upon one measure.
Before we discuss relevant developments in taxation over the past century, we 
must mention at least briefly some important alternative explanations for the ex-day 
phenomenon.
2.2 Market Microstructure Effects
Over the past decade, several authors have advocated a number of microstructure-
based explanations for the ex-day price effect.  Maloney and Mulherin (1992) and Conrad 
and Conroy (1994) find that when stocks split, trades on the ex-day occur more often at 
the ask price than at the bid price.  Thus, the average ex-day closing price would be 
slightly higher than the bid-ask midpoint, possibly creating the false appearance of an 
arbitrage opportunity.  Koski (1996) explicitly considers bid-ask spreads and concludes 
that short-term traders are unable to profit from “dividend stripping” either before or after 
the 1984 and 1986 TRAs.  However, Koski and Michaely (2000) find that abnormal ex-
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day returns still exist even if they are measured using cum-ask to ex-ask prices or cum-
bid to ex-bid prices.
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) hypothesize that dividends carry a “nuisance 
value” and that some investors may deliberately accelerate sell orders or delay buy orders 
to avoid having to cash and reinvest dividend checks.  Jakob and Ma (2003) note that a 
trader who decides on the cum-day to buy a stock can indeed delay the actual purchase 
until the ex-day, but an investor who decides on the ex-day to sell cannot step back in 
time to sell on the cum-day instead.  Consistent with this reasoning, they find an excess 
of buy orders relative to sell orders on ex-days, but no order imbalance on cum-days. 
Dubofsky (1992) proposes another explanation based on exchange rules and 
minimum tick sizes.  NYSE Rule 118 and AMEX Rule 132 state that on a stock’s ex-
dividend day, open limit orders to buy must be adjusted downward by the amount of the 
dividend and rounded down to the next tick if necessary; open limit orders to sell, 
however, are not adjusted automatically.  Based on this explanation, Dubofsky argues 
that ex-day abnormal returns will be a generally increasing function of the dividend with 
a “sawtooth” pattern.
Bali and Hite (1998) develop a model for ex-day trading that incorporates long-
term buyers and sellers with their tax preferences, along with tax-neutral arbitrageurs.  To 
avoid arbitrage, the price drop must be at least the dividend less one tick (D – T) but no 
larger than the dividend (D).  The model predicts that in every case, the ex-dividend price 
drop must be the largest tick multiple that is strictly less than the dividend.  For example, 
if the minimum tick size is $0.125 and the dividend is $0.30, each share would fall by 
$0.25.  In this framework, ex-day abnormal returns would fall and ∆P/D would approach 
26
one if traders were not restricted to prices at certain discrete intervals.  There has been a 
great deal of recent interest in the discreteness hypothesis as the minimum tick size in 
U.S. markets fell from $1/8 to $1/16 in mid-1997, and again from $1/16 to a penny in 
early 2001.4  According to an NYSE Report to the SEC (2001), decimalization caused 
spreads to fall, although not usually to a penny.  There were more trades, but for smaller 
amounts.  In addition, limit orders fell as some traders were afraid of “being pennied.”  
Consistent with Jones and Lipson (2001) on the earlier switch to sixteenths, smaller 
spreads do not necessarily improve market quality and could actually increase trading 
costs for some.
Bauer, Beveridge, and Sivakumar (2002) note that the ex-day phenomenon did 
not disappear after the Canadian markets converted to “decimalized” stock trading.  It is 
now clear that decimalization did not eliminate ex-day returns in the U.S., either.  
Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003) find that ex-day returns are actually higher after 
decimalization, which they attribute to a reduction in the tax rate on capital gains.  Jakob 
and Ma (2004) likewise find that the ex-day phenomenon persists post-decimalization 
and that, contrary to the Bali and Hite (1998) model, price drops before decimalization 
were just as likely to be the tick above the dividend as the tick below.5  Nevertheless, 
research is still ongoing.  Using a slightly longer post-decimal period, Cloyd, Li, and 
Weaver (2004) find that ex-day abnormal returns did fall after decimalization and again 
4 NYSE/AMEX conducted a decimalization “pilot” program with a handful of securities in late 2000 before 
all securities switched to decimal trading on 29 January 2001.  NASDAQ began its own pilot program 
about a month before it switched to decimals on 9 April 2001.
5 Bali (2003) plots ex-day returns over time along with bounds showing what they would have been had 
prices dropped by the tick just above and below the dividend.  Since actual ex-day returns generally fall 
within these bounds, he interprets the results as consistent with the discreteness explanation.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that the sample period for this study ends in 1994, prior to the “tightening” of these 
bounds in 1997 and 2001.
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(though insignificantly) after a 2003 tax law change equalizing personal tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains.
While it is possible that one or more microstructure-based explanations may 
account for some of the variation in ex-day pricing, these hypotheses are not our primary 
focus.  This dissertation focuses instead on the effects of personal and corporate taxes as 
they vary through time. The next chapter reviews important developments in the taxation 
of dividends and capital gains in the U.S. over the past century.
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Chapter 3
Income Taxes in the United States, 1909-20046
3.1 Personal Income Taxation
3.1.1 General History
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the power to “lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises” to raise revenue for national defense and other 
public needs.  Until the twentieth century, this was accomplished through collection of 
tariffs, duties, and excise taxes.  The first tax on income was enacted in 1861 to raise 
revenue for the Union during the Civil War.  In its final version, all income above a $600 
standard deduction was taxed at 3 percent, with any additional income over $10,000 
taxed at 5 percent.  After the war ended, the need for revenue greatly declined.  Since 
excise taxes on liquor and tobacco were then sufficient for the nation’s needs, the tax on 
income was eliminated in 1872.
6 Our general historical narrative of taxation is based largely on “History of the U.S. Tax System,” a fact 
sheet published by the Department of the Treasury, available online at http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-
sheets/taxes/ustax.html.  Ordinary income tax rates were obtained primarily from the IRS data releases 
“Personal Exemptions and Individual Income Tax Rates, 1913-2002” and “Corporation Income Tax 
Brackets and Rates, 1909-2002,” along with IRS Document 6583, “Tax Rates and Tables for Prior Years.”  
Specific histories on the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains were pieced together from the two IRS 
data releases above, along with Pechman (1987), Burman (1999), Barclay (1987), Michaely (1991), Eades 
et al. (1994), Naranjo et al. (2000), recent editions of the U.S. Master Tax Guide, and AICPA Statements of 
Tax Policy No. 1, “Taxation of Capital Gains,” and No. 3, “Elimination of the Double Tax on Dividends.”
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The income tax system as it currently operates in the United States is slightly less 
than a century old.  An 1894 income tax was quickly rejected by the Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional since the tax was not proportional to the states’ populations.  To remove 
the proportionality requirement, Congress later passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution in July 1909, which was ratified by the necessary 36 states (i.e. 75 
percent of the 48 states) by February 1913.  The first income tax under this Amendment 
went into effect on 3 October 1913 and was applied to income received after 1 March 
1913.  The original tax law exempted $4,000 for married couples ($3,000 for singles), so 
that less than one percent of people actually paid taxes at the time.  Income above the 
exemption was taxed at a “normal” rate of 1 percent, with a “surtax” ranging from 1 to 6 
percent assessed on higher incomes, for a maximum combined rate of 7 percent.
Figure 2 illustrates how the maximum personal income tax rate has evolved over 
time.  From the graph, it is obvious that there has been considerable variation, with 
initially low rates rising to their highest levels in the middle of the twentieth century 
before they began to decline in the 1960s.  The first such tax increase, intended to raise 
revenue for World War I, occurred when the 1916 Revenue Act doubled tax rates on the 
bottom bracket from 1 to 2 percent and increased the top combined rate to 15 percent for 
taxpayers with over $2 million in income.  With the 1917 War Revenue Act, the top rate 
immediately rocketed to an unprecedented 67 percent, while the income limit for the 
bottom bracket fell from $20,000 to only $2,000.  These changes increased the number of 
people paying income tax from 1 to 5 percent.
With the end of World War I in 1918 and the strong economy of the 1920s, tax 
rates dropped significantly from 77 percent in 1918 to only 25 percent in 1925.  
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Unfortunately, the strong peacetime economy with low tax rates proved to be short-lived, 
as the low revenues of the Great Depression prompted a reinstatement of higher tax rates, 
with increases to 63 percent in 1932 and to 79 percent in 1936.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Even after these tax hikes, the overall burden of the income tax was 
comparatively small – only about 1 percent of personal income in 1939 compared to 10 
percent in 1988.  The burden continued to be shouldered almost entirely by the highest 
income earners until the 1940s, when taxes were raised further to finance World War II, 
ushering in a 23-year period of the highest personal income tax rates in American history.   
By the end of World War II in 1945, the rate on the lowest income bracket was 23 
percent, the top rate reached its all-time high of 94 percent, and over ten times as many 
people as before the war were paying taxes.  A slight 1946 reduction in these rates proved 
to be short-lived due to the onset of the Korean Conflict in the early 1950s.
At the behest of President Johnson, Congress passed a bill in February 1964 to 
accelerate economic growth by cutting taxes, as the late President Kennedy had urged.  
The top tax rate dropped from 91 to 70 percent over the two-year period from 1963 to 
1965, while the low rate similarly dropped from 20 to 14 percent.  Except for a series of 
surcharges levied from 1968-1970 to finance the Vietnam War, rates remained stable at 
these levels until 1981, when President Reagan signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act, 
similarly designed to stimulate economic growth by cutting marginal tax rates.  By 1982, 
the top and bottom rates had again fallen, this time to 50 and 12 percent, respectively.  
However, some of the provisions of the 1981 Act were reversed in 1984 due to an 
unforeseen recession aggravated at the time by a tight monetary policy.
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The 1986 Tax Reform Act is considered by many to be the most extensive 
overhaul of taxation in the late twentieth century.  Motivated by the principle that high 
marginal tax rates stifle productivity, policymakers slashed the top individual rate over a 
two-year period to only 28 percent, the lowest since 19317.  Despite the rate reduction, 
the 1986 Act was approximately “revenue-neutral” – neither increasing nor decreasing 
total tax receipts significantly – because it broadened the tax base, thereby subjecting 
more types of income to taxation.
The lowest tax rate never exceeded 15 percent after 1988, but continued budget 
deficits soon prompted tax increases in 1991 and 1993, with rates on top income earners 
climbing first to 31 percent under President George H.W. Bush and then to 39.6 percent 
under President Clinton.  However, the trend toward higher rates was reversed shortly 
after the inauguration of President George W. Bush in 2001, as Congress passed a series 
of tax cuts that reduced the lowest tax rate immediately to 10 percent while ultimately 
reducing the top rate to 35 percent by 2003.
3.1.2 Special Tax Rules for Capital Gains
Under the original 1913 tax law, capital gains by individuals were taxed as 
ordinary income at the standard rates.  However, they have enjoyed preferentially low tax 
rates almost continuously since the passage of the Revenue Act of 1921.  From 1922-
1933, gains on assets held at least two years were taxed at a maximum rate of 12.5 
percent, even though top ordinary rates ranged from 24 to 63 percent during the period.  
7 The benefits of the lower 15 percent bracket and the allowable personal exemptions were phased out for 
some high-income taxpayers.  This was accomplished by the creation of a temporary 33 percent bracket.  
Above the phaseout level, however, the marginal rate dropped back to 28 percent.
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(Short-term gains continued to be taxed at the ordinary rate.)  This initial rate ceiling 
benefited only taxpayers in the higher brackets, with the lowest-bracket investors 
enjoying ordinary rates no higher than 4 percent.  In 1934, the 12.5 percent ceiling was 
abolished, and taxpayers were allowed to exclude a percentage of capital gains, ranging 
from 20 percent for assets held from 1-2 years to 70 percent for assets held longer than 
ten years.
In 1938, the rules were revised again to effectively set a 15 percent ceiling rate for 
capital gains on assets held at least 18 months and a 20 percent ceiling for those held for 
two years.  The maximum rate was increased to 25 percent in 1942, but the minimum 
holding period needed to receive this rate was shortened to six months.  Limiting the tax 
rate on capital gains to only 25 percent provided many investors with a powerful tax 
break during a period where ordinary rates ranged from 70 up to 94 percent.  Arguably, 
investors in such an environment would be especially eager to receive income in the 
least-taxed form when they are able to choose.
Beginning in 1970, the rate ceiling was phased out for individuals with capital 
gains exceeding $50,000, but investors were still allowed a 50 percent exclusion on long-
term gains.  Thus, by 1972, high-income individuals could face a maximum long-term 
capital gains rate of 35 percent (i.e. half the ordinary 70 percent rate).  The exclusion was 
increased to 60 percent in November 1978, resulting in a lower effective 28 percent
ceiling rate.  Several years later, the maximum rate was lowered to 20 percent for long-
term gains realized after 9 June 1981.
The minimum holding period imposed on stockholders also changed from time to 
time.  In 1977, investors were required to hold a stock for nine months to receive the 
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preferentially low capital gains rate.  Beginning in January 1978, this requirement was 
increased to one year before the six-month period was later reinstated in June 1984.
As previously mentioned, the 1986 Tax Reform Act made fundamental changes in 
taxation, generally reducing ordinary marginal rates but also subjecting more income to 
tax.  As part of broadening the tax base, the Act eliminated the long-standing preferential 
treatment of capital gains.  Capital gains were to be taxed at a maximum of 28 percent 
during the transitional year 1987 and at ordinary rates thereafter.  However, the special 
tax status of capital gains was soon reinstated when they were exempted from the new, 
higher rates over 28 percent following the 1991 and 1993 tax increases (subject to a one-
year holding period).  The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act left ordinary rates unchanged but 
reduced to 20 percent8 the ceiling rate for long-term capital gains realized after 6 May 
19979.  Finally, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 further 
reduced taxes on long-term gains realized after 5 May 2003, dropping the rate to 15 
percent10.
Historically, capital losses could be deducted against capital gains, although short-
term losses have not always been deductible against long-term gains (and vice-versa).  
However, the deductibility of capital losses against ordinary income has usually been 
subject to a limit (currently $3,000 per year for individuals).
8 10 percent for investors in the lowest tax bracket
9 An 18-month holding period was in effect from 29 July 1997 to 31 December 1997.
10 5 percent for investors in the lowest two tax brackets
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3.1.3 Taxation of Dividends
Dividends received by individuals have historically been taxed at ordinary rates 
regardless of the investor’s holding period; thus, they have generally not been granted the 
same tax-favored status as capital gains.  There are some minor exceptions, however.  
Before 1936, dividends actually were exempted from the low “normal” tax rates but were 
subject to surtax, which Pechman (1987) calls the “progressive element of the individual 
income tax.”  Beginning in 1954, married couples filing jointly were allowed an 
exemption of $100 ($50 for singles) for dividends paid by most U.S. corporations.  In 
addition, a 4 percent tax credit was generally allowed on any non-exempt dividends, 
thereby reducing the marginal tax rate on dividend income slightly.  The exemption was 
raised to $200 ($100 for singles) in 1964, but the credit was reduced to 2 percent and then 
eliminated the next year.  In 1981 only, the exemption increased to $400 ($200 for 
singles) for dividends and interest income, but the previous rules were reinstated in 1982 
before the exemption was finally eliminated altogether in 1987.
Exemption amounts of $100-$400 are of only limited benefit to taxpayers and 
have little bearing on our analysis since the marginal investor almost certainly receives 
more than $400 of dividends.  Clearly, individual investors have received no large tax 
breaks on dividend income over time.  The lone exception has occurred just recently.  For 
the first time in American income tax history, a provision of the 2003 tax relief bill 
allows dividends received after 2002 to be taxed at the same low rate as long-term capital 
gains, currently 15 percent for most taxpayers11.  To receive this special benefit, investors 
must hold the stock for over 60 days around the ex-date but are not required to have held 
11 5 percent for investors in the lowest two tax brackets
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the stock for a year.  This rule clearly reduces the extent of double taxation for corporate 
income, but it has been criticized on the grounds that it primarily benefits higher income 
taxpayers.
3.2 Corporate Income Taxation
3.2.1 General History
The net income of corporations has been taxed since 1909, when the Payne-
Aldrich Act first established an “excise” tax for the privilege of doing business in the 
United States.  The tax, calculated as one percent of profits in excess of $5,000, was very 
small indeed by today’s standards.  After ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 
1913, the excise tax was repealed and a comparable income tax formally took its place.  
Since then, the corporate income tax system has evolved separately alongside the 
personal tax system.  As seen in Figure 3, basic corporate tax rates have changed through 
time in a manner qualitatively similar to that of personal tax rates, generally increasing to 
their highest levels in the mid-twentieth century before starting their decline to present-
day levels.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
A cursory comparison of Figures 2 and 3 suggests that the earnings of the highest-
income individuals historically have been taxed far more heavily than that of top 
corporations.  However, the actual difference is not as great as the graphs imply because 
corporations were frequently assessed an additional “excess profits” tax during wartime, 
usually calculated as a percentage of the corporation’s earnings over and above its prewar 
profits.  Although such taxes were assessed from 1917-1922 for World War I, from 1940-
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1945 for World War II, and from 1950-1953 for the Korean War, they are not reflected in 
Figure 3 because to do so, we would need additional information about the percentage of 
companies whose revenue actually increased during the war.  For the Vietnam War, a tax 
surcharge of 10 percent was added to the normal tax in 1968-1969, with a smaller 2.5% 
surcharge added in 1970.  These adjustments are easily accounted for and hence are 
reflected in Figure 3.
3.2.2 Taxation of Capital Gains
The tax treatment of capital gains and losses on corporately owned stock has 
varied considerably through time.  While individual investors received preferential 
treatment on long-term gains as early as 1922, corporations did not until 1942, when a 25 
percent rate ceiling was applied to gains on stock held at least six months.  This ceiling 
remained in effect through 1969 except for the aforementioned Vietnam War surcharge 
and for a slight increase to 26 percent from 31 March 1951 to 31 March 1954 for the 
Korean War.  The corporate ceiling rate on long-term capital gains was increased to 28 
percent (plus the war surcharge) in 1970 and to 30 percent the following year, where it 
remained until being reduced back to 28 percent in 1979.  As with individuals, the 
minimum holding period required for corporations to receive special low rates on capital 
gains changed from time to time, increasing to nine months in 1977 and to 12 months the 
following year.
The tax-favored status of corporate capital gains was finally ended by the 1986 
Tax Reform Act in an effort to broaden the tax base while reducing ordinary marginal 
rates.  Long-term gains realized in 1987 were taxed at a maximum of 34 percent, which 
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was to become the ordinary rate the following year.  By 1988, all capital gains realized by 
corporations were fully taxed at the ordinary rate.  With the passage of the 1993 Revenue 
Reconciliation Act, the ordinary rate applied to capital gains increased slightly to 35 
percent for corporations with net incomes over $10 million.  Despite the recent changes 
in personal tax laws, no further changes in the corporate rates have occurred to date.
3.2.3 The Intercorporate Dividend Exclusion
One of the greatest disadvantages to the corporate form of business is the problem 
of double taxation.  Earnings are subject to income tax once at the corporate level, and 
again at the individual shareholder level when dividends are paid.  When corporations 
invest directly in stock, however, earnings can actually be taxed three or more times 
before they finally reach shareholders.  To avoid “triple taxation,” corporations have been 
allowed to exclude a large percentage of dividends received from taxable income – a rule 
we refer to as the intercorporate dividend exclusion (ICDE).
Under the original 1909 excise tax, the ICDE was 100 percent, so that 
corporations paid no taxes on dividends from other corporations.  This total exclusion 
continued until 1935, when it was lowered to 90%.  Several years later the ICDE dropped 
to 85 percent, where it remained until the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986.  Under the 
TRA, the exclusion was reduced to 80 percent in 1987 before falling to its current level 
of 70 percent in 1988.12
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3.3 Summary and Implications for Ex-Dividend Stock Prices
The EG model predicts that observed ex-dividend price drop ratios should 
systematically vary through time along with fluctuations in tax rates on dividends and 
capital gains.  Figure 4 illustrates specifically the maximum rates on dividends and 
capital gains for individuals since the inception of the federal income tax.  In most cases, 
dividends are taxed at the ordinary rate while capital gains are taxed at a lower 
preferential rate.  The lower graph in Figure 4 also illustrates how the EG-implied ex-day 
price drop ratio (PDR) should change with the tax rates if high-income individuals are the 
marginal price setters.  Two things from the graphs stand out.  First, consistent with most 
empirical research to date, the implied PDR is almost always less than one.  Second, 
while capital gains tax rates in the mid-twentieth century were comparable to those in 
effect today, ordinary dividend rates were much higher, sometimes over 90 percent.  As a 
result, EG-implied PDRs are extremely low for this period.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]
Of course, the situation is quite different if corporations are the marginal price 
setters.  Recall that corporations have always been allowed a significant exclusion of 
dividend income, ranging from 70 to 100 percent.  Consequently, the effective corporate 
tax rate on dividend income has always been lower than that on capital gains, even when 
corporations were allowed the same kind of capital gains tax breaks granted to 
individuals.  As a result, implied PDRs derived from corporate rates have always been 
greater than one, but exactly how much greater depends on the strategy employed by 
corporate traders around the ex-day.  Ordinary corporate tax rates were highest between 
12 Special rules still allow a 100 percent exclusion for distributions within “affiliated groups” mostly owned 
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the early 1940s and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Panel A of Figure 5 demonstrates that 
since short-term capital gains are always taxed at these normal rates, corporate “dividend 
capturers” should be willing to accept sizeable price drops – sometimes approaching 
twice the dividend amount – during this period.  Meanwhile, as shown by Panel B, long-
term gains were taxed at preferentially low rates, so corporations wishing to buy the stock 
cum-dividend and then actually hold it as an investment would not tolerate such a large 
ex-dividend price drop. However, since there is very little variation in the implied PDRs 
shown in Panel B, we focus on corporate investors primarily in the role of dividend 
capturers for the remainder of this study.
The present discussion raises a number of basic questions that we hope to shed 
some light upon.  First, is the ex-day stock price drop systematically different from the 
dividend (as previous research has found), and does its relative magnitude vary 
systematically with tax rates as predicted by EG?  Second, what type of investors 
influence ex-day stock prices – individuals, corporations, or both?  Finally, do our 
answers change depending on different characteristics of the stock, such as its dividend 
yield and/or suitability for corporate dividend capture?  The next chapter discusses 
several tax-based models of ex-dividend stock pricing and lays out more formally the key 
hypotheses of this study.
by the same entity.
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Chapter 4
Tax Models and their Empirical Predictions
4.1 The “Classic” Elton-Gruber (EG) Model
Elton and Gruber (EG 1970) mathematically derive the expected ex-dividend 
price drop ratio ∆P/D as a function of the tax rates td and tcg on dividends and capital 
gains.  Consider a stock originally purchased by an investor at price P0.  At a specified 
future time, the stock will pay a dividend D to the shareholders.  (In reality, stocks 
usually go ex-dividend several days before the dividend payment, but the time value of 
money between these two dates is generally negligible.)  Assume that the investor has 
already decided to sell the stock at the time of the dividend payment.  The only choice 
remaining is whether to sell before the dividend (cum-dividend) at price Pcum or after the 
dividend (ex-dividend) at price Pex.  If the stock is sold cum-dividend, the investor’s 
profit is the capital gain on the stock, less the capital gains tax paid, or
(Pcum – P0)(1 – tcg).
If the stock is sold ex-dividend, the investor’s profit is the after-tax value of the dividend, 
plus the after-tax value of the reduced capital gain, or
D(1 – td) + (P
ex – P0)(1 – tcg).
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If the seller is to be indifferent between selling cum-dividend and selling ex-dividend, 
then the profits from the two strategies must be equal.  Equating these two expressions 










We refer to the left-hand side of the above equation as the price drop ratio (PDR), 
denoted ∆P/D.
The EG model offers a possible explanation for why the stock price typically 
drops by less than the dividend amount on the ex-day.  If tcg < td, the equation above 
predicts that ∆P/D < 1 (or equivalently, that ∆P < D).  For nearly all of the last century, 
the Internal Revenue Code has indeed allowed for a preferentially low personal tax rate 
on long-term capital gains, while dividend income was taxed at the ordinary, higher tax 
rate.  Higher-tax bracket investors are likely to sell dividend paying stocks sometime 
prior to the ex-day, thus putting some downward pressure on the stock price prior to the 
dividend.  Hence, the stock price is already partially reduced before the ex-day and need 
not fall by the full amount of the dividend on the ex-day.  From this “classic” EG model, 
we obtain the following initial prediction:







, calculated using personal and/or corporate tax rates on dividends 
and capital gains.
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In the same framework, Eades, Hess, and Kim (EHK 1984) demonstrate that taxes 
affect ex-day returns.  They begin by noting that




(1 – tcg)  + cumP
D
(1 – td),
where Ra-t is the after-tax ex-day return for an investor who sells after the dividend.  
Rearranging terms, we obtain




(1 – tcg)  + cumP
D






(1 – tcg)  – cumP
D
(td – tcg)
= R (1 – tcg)  – cumP
D
(td – tcg),
where R is the stock’s before-tax ex-day return.  Solving for R then produces














from which we derive the following prediction:







, calculated using personal and/or corporate tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains.
A more basic implication of Propositions 1 and 2 together is that higher dividend tax 
rates reduce ∆P/D and increase ex-day returns, while higher capital gains tax rates do the 
opposite.  However, certain provisions in the tax code (either now or in the past) have 
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served to increase or decrease effective tax rates from their statutory levels, and these 
features should impact ex-dividend stock price behavior.  For example, the tax code has 
sometimes allowed for a limited amount of dividends to be excluded from taxable 
income, thereby reducing td to zero for some investors. However, individuals have never 
been allowed to exclude more than $400 of dividends per year.  Assuming an average 
annual dividend yield of 1 percent, an investor owning as little as $40,000 of stock would 
have already exhausted the exclusion and would receive no further tax breaks on any 
additional dividend income.  Therefore the personal dividend exemption is very unlikely 
to significantly affect ex-day pricing.
The law has usually allowed for a significant tax break on capital gains.  
However, those wishing to receive the lower tax rate tcg have always been subject to a 
minimum holding period in order to encourage long-term investment.  Currently, a stock 
must be held for one year to be eligible for a lower personal tax rate on capital gains, but 
this rule has changed frequently over time.  By making it more difficult to obtain the 
lower rate, a longer holding period effectively raises tcg to the ordinary rate for some 
investors, thereby weakening the hypothesized cause of the ex-day effect.  The predicted 
impact on ex-dividend stock price behavior is stated below:
Proposition 3: Price drop ratios should be higher, and ex-day returns 
lower, when more stringent requirements (e.g. longer holding periods) 
must be met to obtain a lower tax rate on capital gains.
44
One of the key predictions of the EG tax clientele model is that sometime before 
the ex-date, lower-dividend yield stocks will end up in the hands of investors for whom 
dividends are taxed relatively heavily, while high-yield stocks end up with investors for 
whom dividends are taxed at lesser rates.  In fact, the highest-yield stocks are often 
targeted by corporations for short-term dividend capture trading, provided they meet the 
eligibility requirements for the intercorporate dividend exclusion (ICDE)13.  This means 
that the appropriate tax rates used to calculate implied PDRs and ex-day returns may be 
not be the same for every security:
Proposition 4: For ICDE-eligible stocks with the highest dividend yields, 
the hypothesized relationships in Propositions 1 and 2 should be strongest 
when td and tcg are the corporate tax rates on dividends and short-term 
capital gains, respectively.  For lower-yield stocks, the relationships 














 are calculated using 
personal tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains.
If higher-yield stocks are held by investors with the lowest relative tax rates on 
dividends, then these securities should also have the highest price drop ratios according to 
the basic EG equation.  This implies that observed values of ∆P/D should be related to 
the stock’s dividend yield.  However, this relationship may be stronger at some times 
than at others.  Arguably, if dividends and capital gains were taxed identically, there 
13 Most distributions by domestic corporations are eligible for the ICDE.
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would be no reason for tax clienteles at all.  On the other hand, high top ordinary rates 
along with numerous lower tax brackets give rise to tax clienteles and a spectrum of 
implied PDRs.  These predictions are summarized below:
Proposition 5: Price drop ratios generally should be directly related to 
dividend yields.  For ICDE-eligible stocks with the highest dividend yields, 
this relationship should be strongest when the differential is greatest 
between corporate dividend and short-term capital gains tax rates.  For 
other stocks, the relationship between PDR and dividend yield should be 
strongest when the differential is greatest between personal dividend and 
long-term capital gains rates.
While it is clear that ∆P/D should increase with the dividend yield (D/P), it is not so clear 
whether ex-day returns should increase or decrease with D/P.  This can be understood by 
examining the stock return equation derived by EHK (1984),














At first glance, it appears obvious that ex-day returns should be positively related to D/P 
so long as dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains.  This would be true if td
and tcg were constant across all securities for every investor.  However, we have already 
noted that higher-yield securities will attract investors with lower dividend tax rates.  
Since ex-day returns are also directly related to td, the net effect of an increase in D/P on 
the expected ex-day return is unclear.
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4.2 A Tax Timing Model of Ex-Dividend Price Behavior
While affirming the basic predictions of the EG and transaction costs models 
above, we now develop a new “tax timing” model addressing an additional consideration 
in ex-day pricing – specifically, the stockholder’s ability to postpone the recognition of 
capital gains, thereby deferring taxes until a later date.  While the simple EG model 
implicitly assumes that the investor has already decided to sell the stock at the time of the 
dividend distribution (the only decision being whether to sell just before or just after), we 
recognize that the investor may simply choose to hold the stock and sell it much later.  
This may be a viable option even for those in the highest tax brackets if they currently 
own stock with significant unrecognized capital gains.  Dividends are usually quite small 
relative to stock prices, and the benefits from deferring capital gains taxes to a later date 
may very well be worth the cost of higher dividend taxes.
Consider the following simple example.  Suppose we invested $10,000 one year 
ago in a stock whose value has since grown by 50 percent, making our holding worth 
$15,000 today.  Suppose further that our capital gains tax rate tcg = 25%, while the 
dividend tax rate td = 40%.  The stock is about to pay a 0.5 percent quarterly dividend, or 
$75 in our case.  If we sell now to avoid paying an additional $11.25 in dividend taxes 
(calculated as $75 times the 15 percent difference between the two tax rates), we must 
recognize a $5,000 capital gain and pay $1,250 in taxes now.  The additional $11.25 may 
very well be an acceptable “financing cost” to delay a tax payment of $1,250 even for 
less than one quarter.  Although the preceding example is perhaps overly simplistic, it 
does illustrate the basic reasoning behind our model.
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We now develop the tax timing model formally.  Assume that an investor buys a 
stock today for price P0.  At time T1, a dividend D will be paid to shareholders, at which 
time the stock price will drop from Pcum1 to P
ex
1 .  In this model, the investor may sell the 
stock either immediately before the dividend distribution or immediately after.  However, 
the investor may also wait until a specified later time T2 and sell the stock then for price 
P2.  We assume that the investor behaves so as to maximize end-of-period wealth at T2.
If the stock is sold cum-dividend, the investor’s wealth at time T1 is the selling 
price minus taxes paid on the gain, or
Pcum1 – ( P
cum
1 – P0) tcg ,
which is equal to
Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg .
By assumption, this amount is then reinvested in a similar security, where it subsequently 
grows at the required rate of return k > 0.  At time T2, the investor’s pre-tax wealth is
[ Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] e
kτ,
where τ = T2 – T1, which leaves
[ Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] e
kτ (1 – tcg) + [ Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] tcg, or
[ Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg]
remaining after capital gains taxes are paid at time T2.  It is helpful to note that the factor
ekτ (1 – tcg) + tcg
above, which can also be written as
ekτ – (ekτ – 1) tcg,
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captures the effect of growing an initial investment at rate k for a length of time τ and 
subsequently taxing the gain at rate tcg.
If the investor sells ex-dividend, the situation is similar, except that his after-tax 
wealth at time T1 is
D (1 – td) + P
ex
1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg,
which includes the after-tax value of the dividend and the ex-dividend capital gain.  This 
amount is then reinvested in a similar security until T2, at which time taxes are levied on 
the capital gain, leaving the investor with end-of-period wealth
[D (1 – td) + P
ex
1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg].
Now suppose the investor never sells the stock until time T2.  In this case, the 
after-tax dividend proceeds D(1 – td) are reinvested until T2, at which point taxes are 
assessed on the additional gain.  The stock price grows at rate k from its ex-dividend level 
Pex1 , but the final stock sale is taxed with respect to the original basis of P0.  Thus, the 
investor’s end-of-period after-tax wealth is
D (1 – td) [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] + [ Pex1 e
kτ (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg].
Note that this is equal to the previous expression when k = 0 or τ = 0, corresponding to 
the trivial case where there is either no return from future investment or no time left in 
which to invest.
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions so that holding the stock is 
better than selling it ex-dividend and reinvesting the proceeds – that is,
D (1 – td) [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] + [ Pex1 e
kτ (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] > …
[D (1 – td) + P
ex
1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg].
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We immediately notice that the dividend term is the same on both sides of the inequality.  
This is no surprise since the dividend is taxed and reinvested identically in both cases.  
Thus, we are left with the inequality
Pex1 e
kτ (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg > [ Pex1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg].
Rearranging terms, we have
Pex1 e
kτ (1 – tcg) – Pex1 (1 – tcg) [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] > P0 tcg [ekτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] – P0 tcg,
which, after grouping terms and factoring, yields the inequality
Pex1 (1 – tcg)(e
kτ – 1) tcg > P0 tcg (ekτ – 1) (1 – tcg).
Assuming (trivially) that 0 < tcg < 1, this simplifies easily to
Pex1  > P0.
Thus, the mathematics confirms our intuition that when the ex-dividend stock price is 
higher than the price originally paid for the stock, it is better to continue holding the stock 
if feasible and put off recognizing the capital gain for tax purposes, assuming we do not 
sell cum-dividend.
If the stock price at time T1 is lower than the price originally paid, it is optimal to 
sell immediately to recognize the capital loss for a tax deduction.  In this case nothing is 
different from the EG model.  Since our third strategy (holding the stock) is suboptimal, 
the investor has a choice between selling cum-dividend and selling ex-dividend.  If we 
equate end-of period wealth from these two investment strategies, we have
[ Pcum1 (1–tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1–tcg) + tcg] = [D (1–td) + Pex1 (1–tcg) + P0 tcg] [e
kτ (1–tcg) + tcg],
which reduces to
Pcum1 (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg = D (1 – td) + P
ex











the familiar EG equation.
Of course, stock prices actually rise more often than they fall.  When Pex1  > P0, 
selling ex-dividend and reinvesting in a similar security is not rational, so the investor 
must choose between selling cum-dividend (avoiding the higher tax rate on dividend 
income) and simply continuing to hold the stock (incurring dividend taxes but delaying 
capital gains taxes).  For an investor to be indifferent between these two strategies, end-
of-period wealth must be the same for either alternative; that is,
[ Pcum1 (1–tcg) + P0tcg] [e
kτ(1–tcg) + tcg] = D(1–td) [ekτ(1–tcg) + tcg] + Pex1 e
kτ(1–tcg) + P0tcg.
Rearranging terms, we have
Pcum1 (1 – tcg) [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] – Pex1 e
kτ (1 – tcg) + P0 tcg [ekτ (1 – tcg) + tcg] – P0 tcg
… = D (1 – td) [e
kτ (1 – tcg) + tcg],
or
Pcum1 (1–tcg)[e
kτ(1–tcg) + tcg] – Pex1 e
kτ(1–tcg) + P0tcg(ekτ–1)(1–tcg) = D(1–td)[ekτ(1–tcg) + tcg].
Unfortunately, the greater complexity of this equation does not allow us to derive 
a concise mathematical expression for ∆P/D as EG do.  However, ex-day pricing in this 
modified framework can be understood qualitatively as follows.  When dividends are 
taxed more heavily than capital gains, there would normally be an incentive for taxpaying 
investors to sell their stock before it goes ex-dividend.  Consequently, the ex-day stock 
price drop ∆P is less than the dividend D.  However, the incentive to sell may be 
weakened (or perhaps completely overshadowed) by the fact that if the investor decides 
to sell an appreciated stock, capital gains taxes can be delayed no further.  By retaining 
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the stock and receiving the dividend, he retains control over the timing of capital gains 
recognition.  Thus, the ability to postpone capital gains taxes creates a counterincentive 
not to sell the stock – and the larger the unrealized capital gain, the stronger the 
counterincentive.  It follows that for such stocks, the ex-day effect should be weaker; that 
is, ∆P/D should be higher than EG predict.  In fact, in this modified framework, the 
expected price drop ∆P would be greater than the dividend D if dividends and capital 
gains were taxed at the same rate.  We now show this formally.
Suppose Pex1  > P0 and td = tcg = t.  Beginning with the most recent equation above, 
we have
Pcum1 (1–t) [e
kτ (1–t) + t] – [ Pex1 e
kτ (1–t) – P0 t (ekτ – 1)(1–t)] = D(1–t) [ekτ (1–t) + t],
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 = Pex1 .
Combining this result with the equation above yields
Pcum1 – P
ex
1  > D,
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so that ∆P/D > 1, as expected.  Of course, this result is not usually observed in general.  
Most studies find that ∆P/D < 1 on average, and some reach this conclusion even when 
td = tcg.  A failure to document average price drops greater than the dividend should not be 
interpreted as an outright rejection of the tax timing model.  We must remember that 
there are two sides to every transaction.  The timing model considers the ex-day pricing 
problem from the viewpoint of prospective security sellers, but the tax situation of a 
prospective buyer around the ex-date is different.  Buyers are unaffected by the security’s 
past performance; they need to know only the current price and expected future changes.  
Just as we demonstrate that the seller’s equilibrium price drop ratio is higher than that 
implied by EG for appreciated stocks, Booth and Johnston (1984) demonstrate that the 













Clearly both sides are relevant.  The tax situation of buyers helps affects the demand for 
the security, while the tax situation of sellers affects the supply of the security for sale.  
The interaction of the two then determines the stock price.  In this dissertation, however, 
we focus on the implications of the tax timing model that are not contradicted by their 
demand-side counterpart.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Again, the impact of recent stock price performance adds a layer of complexity to 
the timing model, so that it is not possible to derive an EG-style expression for the price 
drop ratio.  Nevertheless, the expected ex-dividend price can be computed when more 
specific information about the security in question is known.  Figure 6 illustrates the price 
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drop ratios and ex-day returns implied by the EG and EHK equations versus those 
implied by the tax timing model.  EG-implied PDRs are calculated for various dividend 
tax rates assuming a capital gains rate of 20 percent.  EHK-implied returns are computed 
for a stock whose value is $100 before a $0.50 dividend.  In calculating the timing model-
implied values, we further assume that the stock was originally purchased for $80, that its 
expected rate of return k is 10 percent, and that the reinvestment period τ is three months 
(0.25 years).  Confirming our prior theoretical arguments, the tax timing model predicts 
higher PDRs and lower ex-day returns than the classic model.
The central prediction of the tax timing model is that recent stock price 
performance affects ex-dividend price behavior by influencing investors’ decisions about 
whether to sell.  We formally state this prediction as follows:
Proposition 6: Price drop ratios should be directly (and ex-day returns 
inversely) related to the stock’s recent price performance.  This 
relationship should be stronger for low-yield stocks and for those that 
have recently increased rather than decreased in value.
Figure 7 illustrates the timing model-implied price drop ratios and ex-day returns 
for a stock originally purchased for $80 that has since grown to a cum-dividend value of 
$100, assuming dividend and capital gains tax rates of 40 and 20 percent, respectively. 
Although the extent of the variation depends on parameters such as the dividend yield 
and reinvestment period, one thing is clear.  In every case, the cheaper the stock was 
originally acquired (i.e. the greater the unrealized capital gain), the higher the implied 
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PDR and the lower the ex-day return.  The only exception occurs when the stock was 
originally acquired at a higher price than its current value (i.e. when a loss has occurred), 
in which case the PDRs and ex-day returns assume the same values implied by the 
“classic” model.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Strictly speaking, the tax timing model implies that there is no covariation 
between ∆P/D and ( Pcum1 – P0) for stocks that have recently declined in value.  
Empirically, though, we may still observe some relationship because not all investors will 
have purchased the security at the same time and price.  In other words, one investor may 
have experienced a net gain while another experienced a net loss, even though both 
currently hold the same security.  
The strength of the relationship between ex-day price behavior and recent stock 
price performance may also depend on the dividend yield.  First, as implied by Figure 7, 
the relative importance of putting off capital gains taxes declines when the dividend (and 
its associated taxes) are greater.  Second, since the highest-yield stocks are often targeted 
for short-term dividend capture, longer-term accrued capital gains may be little or no 
issue for them.
If true, Proposition 6 has important implications for the numerous “before and 
after” studies of how a particular event affected ex-dividend stock price behavior.  
Without accounting for previous stock price performance, changes in price drop ratios (or 
lack thereof) might erroneously be associated with the event in question, leading to 
incorrect conclusions.
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The notion that investors may retain past “winners” and sell past “losers” for tax 
reasons is not entirely new.  Indeed, it is a commonly cited explanation for the well-
known “January effect,” where stocks (particularly smaller ones) tend to perform better 
during the first few days of the new year.  We do not deny that investors may be 
especially sensitive to the tax consequences of their decisions late in the year.  For this 
reason, we also test the following proposition:
Proposition 7: For stocks that have recently appreciated (declined) in 
value, price drop ratios should be higher (lower), ex-day returns lower 
(higher), and abnormal trading volume lower (higher) for ex-dividend 
days that occur in the last quarter of the year than for ex-dividend days 
occurring in the first three quarters. 
Even if Proposition 7 proves true, investors still should not ignore the tax 
consequences of their trading decisions earlier in the year.  For example, one should not 
necessarily wait until the end of the year to sell a stock whose price has declined.  It may 
be advantageous to sell a losing stock earlier to “lock in” the tax deduction.  After all, the 
deduction may be lost if the stock price were to rebound later in the year.  (In fact, if 
there were no transaction costs and capital losses were always fully deductible, investors 
would optimally sell a stock after every price decline – no matter how small – whenever 
the current stock price is less than the basis.)  In addition, even if a capital gain is realized 
early in the year, it is still realized, and taxes will be paid. Nevertheless, investors may 
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be especially reluctant to realize capital gains before ex-dates that are in the last quarter 
since only a short wait is required to push the gain into the next tax year.
In any event, we affirm the basic premise of EG and subsequent tax-based models 
that there is tax-motivated trading around ex-dividend dates.  Investors must decide 
whether to retain the stock and receive the dividend or to sell cum-dividend and receive a 
higher capital gain.  The relative attractiveness of selling surely must be influenced by 
whether it would result in a taxable gain or a deductible loss.
4.3 Investor Anticipation of Tax Law Changes 
We wish to make one further generalization.  Both the EG model and our 
modified tax model above assume that tax rates td and tcg are constant, or at least that 
traders make decisions based only on the current rates.  In reality, investors know that 
politicians cannot leave the tax code alone.  In many cases, investors can even anticipate 
the direction and extent of future changes in taxation.  Candidates elected in November 
usually are not sworn into office until the following January, and their positions on tax 
policy are generally well understood prior to the election.  Furthermore, when tax 
legislation is ultimately passed, it usually comes as no surprise, as there have been 
months of preparation and debate beforehand.  Sometimes changes in tax rates are even 
scheduled explicitly by the tax code itself.  For all these reasons, it is realistic to believe 
that investors often predict future tax rates with reasonable accuracy.
Armed with such knowledge, traders can do better still.  For example, if we knew 
that Congress and the President were likely to reduce tax rates on capital gains next year, 
we would be wise to hold off on selling our stock at least until then.  This creates a 
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powerful counterincentive not to sell an appreciated stock cum-dividend, even though 
holding it would force us to pay a higher tax rate on dividends received in the meantime.  
This counterincentive works just as described in the previous section – i.e., to raise ∆P/D 
and lower ex-day returns.  Suppose, however, that a different party gained control of 
Congress and the White House, and that capital gains tax rates were likely to rise next 
year.  A marginal investor on the ex-day who otherwise would have been slightly better 
off holding the stock might now be influenced to sell it and avoid next year’s higher tax 
rate.  In this case, we would expect to see lower price drop ratios and higher ex-day 
returns for appreciated stock.  Financial planners frequently advise their clients to employ 
such dynamic tax-avoidance strategies14 and, as shown by a recent example, corporations 
are often happy to help their shareholders in this matter15.  It is not unreasonable to think 
that such considerations may be the deciding factor for a “marginal” investor who must 
decide whether to sell his stock prior to the ex-day.  It is also not unreasonable to think 
that investors may be especially aware of these tax issues late in the year.  For these 
reasons, we make the following prediction:
Proposition 8: Price drop ratios will be higher, and ex-day returns 
lower, for appreciated stocks preceding a reduction in the capital gains 
tax rate.
14 See, for example, the discussion on tax planning by Harden, Biggart, and Richmond (2003).
15 “Microsoft to Dole Out Its Cash Hoard,” 21 July 2004, Wall Street Journal, p. A1.
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Chapter 5
Data and Empirical Tests
5.1 Sample Selection
Our largest sample for this study consists of all taxable cash dividends16 paid to 
holders of NYSE- or AMEX-listed stocks identified by the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) from July 1962 to December 2003.  In some cases, a firm has 
more than one distribution with the same ex-date.  When this occurs, we combine them 
into a single observation if they are all regular taxable cash dividends as defined above.  
Otherwise, all distributions by that firm for that ex-date are deleted from the sample.  We 
also eliminate dividends with ex-dates occurring less than four trading days after the 
firm’s previous ex-date, dividends smaller than $0.01, and those paid by “penny stocks” 
trading at less than $1 per share.  To ensure that measures of ex-day price changes are 
meaningful, we require that the stock be actively traded (i) on the ex-day itself or one of 
the following five trading days, and (ii) on the cum-day itself or one of the preceding five 
trading days.  There must also be no change in shares outstanding between the cum- and 
ex-days due to a stock split or other event.  Finally, following Naranjo, Nimalendran, and 
Ryngaert (NNR 2000), we limit the sample to only those firms identified as domestic 
corporations (CRSP share type codes 10 and 11) so that all dividends are treated the same 
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with respect to eligibility for the intercorporate dividend exclusion (ICDE).  This group 
of dividends comprises our “CRSP” sample.
Since CRSP provides daily prices only back to 1962, most studies of ex-dividend 
stock price behavior do not use data from before that time.  This is understandable but 
nonetheless unfortunate because tax rates then were often very different from those in 
more recent times.  One of the most important contributions of this dissertation is to 
examine ex-dividend stock price behavior over a long period of time, including the pre-
1962 era that has received almost no attention in the literature so far.  Unfortunately, the 
only way to obtain daily stock prices from that period is to hand-collect them from old 
newspapers.  To say the least, creating a comprehensive database of cum- and ex-
dividend prices from 1962 back to the inception of the income tax would be a daunting 
task.  Therefore, we construct a second sample consisting of dividends paid by only those 
stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  We choose this “Dow” sample both because 
it is small enough to keep the task of data collection manageable and because it consists 
of well-known, actively traded companies for which reliable prices are usually readily 
available.  Admittedly, the composition of our Dow sample shifts through time as firms 
are added to and drop out of the index.  However, this is also true of the entire universe of 
NYSE/AMEX-listed stocks on CRSP.  Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that 
the sample varies in any way that would systematically bias our results.
The Dow sample is constructed as follows.  From July 1962 to December 2003, 
ex-dividend dates, dividend amounts, and close-to-close stock price changes are obtained 
from CRSP.  From January 1926 to June 1962, ex-dates and dividend amounts are 
16 Dividends with a CRSP distribution of the form 12N2, where N is any digit from 1 to 9
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obtained from CRSP, and close-to-close stock price changes are obtained from the Wall 
Street Journal.  From January 1910 to December 1925, ex-dates and stock prices are 
obtained from the Wall Street Journal, and dividend amounts are inferred from the prices 
and the daily change reported for the ex-day17.
Of course, if the reported results for the CRSP and Dow samples were different, it 
might be unclear whether the discrepancy was due to the use of different sample firms or 
a different time period.  To facilitate comparisons, we also create a “Post-1962 Dow” 
sample, which consists of observations in both samples above.  Thus, differences 
between the CRSP and Post-1962 Dow samples are most likely due to characteristics of 
firms included in the two samples, while differences between the Dow and Post-1962 
Dow samples are probably due to the sample period employed.
5.2 Dependent Variables
Historically, studies have used two inversely related measures to gauge the 
behavior of ex-dividend stock prices.  The first of these – the price drop ratio (PDR), or 
∆P/D – is intuitively appealing because it explicitly compares the two quantities of 
interest.  In this study, ex-dividend price drops are calculated as






17 The daily price change reported in the Wall Street Journal is computed as
Daily change = Today’s closing price – Previous closing price + Dividend,
so the dividend amount can be inferred as
Dividend = Daily change + Cum-day closing price – Ex-day closing price.
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where Rm,ex is the return on an appropriate index of peer firms realized on the stock’s ex-
day.  For the CRSP sample, we use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ equally-weighted 
market index; for the two Dow samples, we use the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Note 
that the ex-day closing price Pex is specifically market-adjusted in order to better isolate 
the idiosyncratic component of the price movement.18  Pex is normally the closing price 
on the ex-day itself.  However, when there is no trading volume on the ex-day, Pex is 
defined as the first available closing price after the ex-day, provided that at least one of 
the following five days has positive trading volume.  Similarly, when there is no trading 
volume on the cum-day itself, Pcum is the first available closing price before the cum-day, 
so long as a trade occurs on at least once in the preceding five days.  When either Pcum or 
Pex must be adjusted in this manner, Rm,ex is also adjusted to reflect the cumulative market 
return over the appropriate interval.
As an ex-day pricing measure, the price drop ratio is not without its statistical 
problems.  Probably the most significant issue is that a given price fluctuation has a 
greater impact on the ratio ∆P*/D for smaller dividends.  Thus, parameter estimates 
depend heavily on what price fluctuations occur around the smallest dividends – even 
though these fluctuations for the most part have nothing to do with the dividends. To 
reduce the distortion caused by outliers, we calculate ∆P*/D individually for each 
dividend and then remove observations in the upper and lower 1 percent of each sample.  
This reduces the influence not only of extremely small dividends but also of 
18 Theoretically, we should multiply the market return by the stock’s beta as part of the adjustment.  
However, precise estimation of beta is difficult due to a variety of problems, including non-stationarity 
concerns and the necessity of price data over an estimation period (which would vastly increase the amount 
of data that would have to be hand-collected).  In addition, if the empirically observed Security Market 
Line (SML) is flatter than theory implies, it is not altogether clear whether using the steeper, theoretical 
SML is better than no beta adjustment at all.
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extraordinarily large price fluctuations due to major market disruptions (e.g. 1929 market 
crash, 9/11).
The second type of quantity frequently used to measure ex-dividend price 
behavior is the stock’s ex-day return, including both the dividend yield and capital gain 
(or loss) yield.  Although it is a less direct comparison of the price drop versus the 
dividend, the ex-day return is less prone to distortion by small dividends than the PDR.  










Where Pex , Pcum , and Rm,ex  are as defined above.
5.3 Empirical Tests
Now that we have described our samples and dependent variables, we turn our 
attention to testing the key predictions of the tax-based models developed in Chapter 4.
5.3.1 Testing Traditional Tax Models of Ex-Dividend Price Behavior
The classic tax model of ex-dividend price behavior implies that the expected 
price drop ratio (PDR) is a function of the dividend and capital gains tax rates td and tcg.  
As an initial check of this theory, we test Proposition 1 on each of our three samples (i.e. 
CRSP, Dow, and Post-1962 Dow) by regressing19 PDRs on the EG-implied quantity 
19 All tests of the EG tax clientele model are carried out using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Qualitatively 
similar results were also obtained using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) allowing for 












computed from the personal and corporate tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains in effect at the time of each dividend. Of course, individual investors do not all 
face the same marginal rate.  The usual approach is to consider only the marginal rate on 
the highest tax bracket.  However, the income level to which the top personal tax rate is 
applied has fluctuated considerably, ranging from $30,000 to $5 million through time.  
Therefore, we estimate all regressions involving personal tax rates two ways – once using 
rates levied on the highest income bracket, and once using the marginal rates faced by an 
individual with a constant inflation-adjusted20 income of $200,000 (in real 2003 dollars).  
For regressions involving corporate tax rates, however, we use only the rates that would 
be faced by a corporate dividend capturer in the highest bracket.  We do not use an 
alternative inflation-adjusted set of tax rates for corporate income because the threshold 
for maximum corporate tax brackets never exceeded $100,000 until 1984.  Even after 
1984, however, there was never a sizeable difference between the tax rates in any of the 
higher brackets.  The specific equations estimated are























+ εi , and












20 Income values were adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
64
Positive coefficients estimates α̂ 1 are expected for one or more sets of implied PDRs, 
with their magnitudes an indication of both how much taxes impact the ex-day price drop 
and what type of investor is most influential.  Our initial results in Table 1 show 
considerable support for the idea that personal tax rates influence the price drop-to-
dividend ratio.  Coefficient estimates α̂ 1 are positive (and usually significant) in all 
samples when either set of personal tax rates (i.e. maximum or inflation-adjusted) is used 
in the classic EG formula.
Nevertheless, several questions are raised.  First, we immediately notice that 
estimates of α1 are similarly negative using corporate tax rates – implying that PDRs tend 
to move in the opposite direction from what EG would predict if corporate dividend 
capturers were the marginal price setters.  A visual examination of Figure 4 and Panel A 
of Figure 5 reveals a strong negative relation between the PDRs implied by corporate 
dividend capture tax rates and those implied by individual rates.  Collectively, these 
findings are consistent with individuals, and not corporations, being the marginal 
investors on the ex-dividend day.  We also note that not all estimates of α1 are 
statistically significant.  The insignificance of the estimate using inflation-adjusted tax 
rates in the Post-1962 Dow sample ( α̂ 1 = 0.2674) is understandable given its unusually 
high standard error of 0.2240.  The estimate itself is actually very comparable with others 
in Table 1 that are significant.  However, the same cannot be said for the estimate using 
maximum tax rates in the Dow sample ( α̂ 1 = 0.0426); it is simply much smaller.  The 
insignificance of this estimate suggests that the marginal investor on the ex-day may be 
better characterized as an individual with a reasonably (but not excessively) high income.  
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This may be particularly true during part of the earlier 20th century when only incomes in 
excess of $1 million were taxed at the highest rate.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Theory does not suggest that market-adjusted returns (MARs) depend on tax rates 
alone.  However, Eades, Hess, and Kim (EHK 1984) show that ex-day returns should be 







, as stated in Proposition 2.  Therefore, we similarly perform 
the following regressions for returns:
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As before, we expect γ1 to be positive, depending on the importance of taxes in ex-day 
pricing and the relative market influence of different types of investors. The results for 
MARs (shown in Table 2) are largely consistent with our tests of Proposition 1 with 










 is calculated using personal tax rates, all of our estimates γ̂ 1 are 
positive, and all but one are significant.  Furthermore, all estimates of γ1 are significantly 
negative when corporate tax rates are used.  As before, the estimated coefficient ( γ̂ 1 = 
0.000422) using maximum personal tax rates in the Dow sample is much smaller in 
magnitude than all the others and is no more than about one standard error from zero.
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These findings reinforce our earlier conclusions that ex-dividend day stock price changes 
in general are affected by personal tax rates, that the marginal ex-day investor is not 
necessarily always in the highest income bracket, and that corporate dividend capturers 
are not the marginal price setters for our sample period as a whole.
Whenever capital gains have been taxed preferentially, the tax code has always 
required investors to hold a stock for a minimum length of time (ranging from 6 to 18 
months) in order to qualify for a lower rate.  This has the effect of encouraging long-term 
investing, but it also increases the effective capital gains tax rate for those who are unable 
or unwilling to hold the stock for the designated number of months.  To test the effect of 
holding period requirements, our initial regressions are augmented with the variables 
CGHOLDi,pers, the number of months an individual must hold a stock to qualify for the 
lower rate on capital gains.  We do not include a holding period variable for corporations, 
since dividend capturers are by definition not interested in holding the stock long-term.  
For price drop ratios, we estimate











+ α2 CGHOLDi,pers   + εi   and











+ α2 CGHOLDi,pers + εi .
For ex-day market-adjusted returns, the appropriate regressions are











+ γ2 CGHOLDi,pers   + εi  and











+ γ2 CGHOLDi,pers + εi .
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The capital gains tax break was not implemented until 1922 and disappeared briefly from 
1988-1990 after the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Since the variable CGHOLD cannot be 
defined during these periods when the dividend and capital gains rates were identical, 
only ex-dividend dates from 1922-1987 and 1991-2003 are included in the 
aforementioned regressions.  As suggested by Proposition 3, we expect the length of the 
capital gains holding period to be positively related to PDR (so that α2 > 0) and 
negatively related to MARex (so γ2 < 0).  Our results for PDRs and MARs, reported in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively, are very supportive of this prediction.  All estimates α̂ 2 are 
positive and most are significant.  Similarly, all estimates γ̂ 2 are negative and all but one 
are significant.  Thus, longer holding periods appear to make it more difficult to realize 
the tax break on capital gains (the hypothesized cause of the ex-day anomaly), thereby 
causing PDRs to increase toward 1 and abnormal returns to decline toward zero.  











have the hypothesized signs and significance levels generally observed in Table 1.  We 
suspect, however, that this is caused by multicollinearity between the tax and holding 
period variables.  The required holding period had its lowest value (6 months) from 1942 
to 1976 – a period which also saw some of the largest differentials between dividend and 
capital gains tax rates and the lowest EG-implied PDRs of the 20th century.  Therefore, 
our CGHOLD estimates α̂ 2 and γ̂ 2 may be driven by the capital gains holding period or
by the tax rates themselves (or some combination of the two), but in either case, the 
results support the tax argument.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
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So far, we have tested the impact of both personal and corporate tax rates on all 
stocks in our samples.  If the tax clientele model holds, though, higher-dividend yield 
stocks will attract different investors than lower-yield stocks.  Therefore, different sets of 
tax variables may be appropriate for securities with different dividend yields.  Following 
EHK (1994) and NNR (2000), we sort each of our three samples quarterly into quintiles 
by dividend yield (D/Pcum).  Stocks falling into the highest quintile become part of our 
high-yield (HY) subsample, while those in the bottom four quintiles comprise the low-
yield (LY) group.  The initial set of regressions is then repeated on the newly formed 
subgroups.  High-dividend yield stocks would most likely attract corporations, who are 
taxed much more heavily on capital gains, while other stocks would probably be held by 
individuals, who are taxed more heavily on dividends.  Therefore, Proposition 4 states 






















calculated using “corporate 
dividend capture” rates should have more predictive power in the HY groups21, while 
personal tax rate variables should dominate in the LY subsamples. Our results for PDRs 
and MARs are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. As expected, ex-dividend price 
behavior in the LY group is very similar to that in the entire sample.  Using personal tax 
rates, all Panel B slope estimates α̂ 1 and γ̂ 1 are positive – generally more so than when 
HY and LY stocks were combined (see Tables 1-2) – and all but one are statistically
significant.  Using corporate tax rates, the slopes are all significantly negative.  These 
21 As implied by Proposition 4, it is also important whether a high-yield stock is eligible for the 
intercorporate dividend exclusion (ICDE).  Some dividends paid by REITs and bond funds are ICDE-
ineligible, and a different set of tax rates might be more relevant for these.  However, we do not control for 
ICDE-eligibility at this stage because our overall sample is limited to domestic corporations, all of which 
should qualify for the tax break.
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results support the idea that individual investors are the marginal price setters for LY 
stocks on ex-days. For HY stocks, we initially expected α1 and γ1 to be positive for the 
corporate tax variables since higher-yield equities are the most likely targets of corporate 
dividend capture.  However, this second prediction is not borne out by the evidence in 
Panel A of Tables 5-6.  For the CRSP HY subsample, the estimates α̂ 1 and γ̂ 1 are similar 
to those in the overall sample (i.e. positive for personal tax rates and negative for 
corporate rates).  For the Dow and Post-1962 Dow HY subsamples, all slope estimates
are largely insignificant. These results suggest that for our sample period, corporate tax 
rates do not significantly impact the ex-dividend stock price behavior of even high-yield 
stocks.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
At first, this might appear to contradict the tax clientele theory.  However, it is 
commonly accepted that corporate dividend capture was greatly facilitated by the 
introduction of negotiable commissions on 1 May 1975.  Before then, the high 
transaction costs associated with fixed commissions may have rendered corporate
dividend capture infeasible.  Using only ex-dates from the negotiable commission era, an 
additional regression finds that market-adjusted returns (MARs) are indeed positively 
related to corporate dividend capture tax rates in the CRSP HY subsample.  Furthermore, 
MARs in the corresponding CRSP LY subsample are negatively related to corporate tax 
rates.  Regressions with PDRs in the negotiable commission era yield similar results, with 
slope estimates α̂ 1 having identical signs but falling just short of statistical significance 
at the 10 percent level.  These results are consistent with NNR (2000), whose findings 
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suggest that corporate dividend capture was prominent only among HY stocks and only 
after May 1975.
Regardless of whether corporate tax rates impact ex-dividend stock price behavior 
after 1975, it is clear that they did not do so for either of our sample periods (1962-2003 
or 1910-2003) considered as a whole, even for high-yield stocks.  Therefore, for the 
remainder of our empirical tests, only tax variables based on personal rates – which 
clearly are related to ex-day pricing – will be used.
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here]
In Table 7, we present results from performing the regressions






















+ εi   and























where HYi is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if observation i is in the HY subgroup, 
and 0 otherwise.  All estimates α̂ 2 are positive and significant – with the exception of the 
Dow sample estimate using maximum personal tax rates, which was also insignificant in 
the initial test of Proposition 1.  Furthermore, the fact that the estimates α̂ 3 are all 
negative suggests that the strength of the relationship between PDRs and personal tax 
rates may decline somewhat for higher-yield stocks – again consistent with the notion 
that individual investors are more prone to purchase lower-yield stocks.  However, we 
cannot draw this conclusion formally since none of the α3 estimates are statistically 
significant.  Similarly, Table 8 presents results from estimating
71






















 + εi   and























As expected, we find that MARs also are significantly related to both maximum and 
inflation-adjusted personal tax rates in all three samples.  However, there is mixed 
evidence about whether the effect strengthens or weakens with higher-yield stocks.  
Intuition predicts that it should weaken, but it is possible that the estimate γ̂ 3 may be 
positive since the HY dummy variable to some extent proxies for D/Pcum, which EHK 
(1984) demonstrate is positively related to the ex-day return.
If higher-yield stocks attract investors with relatively low dividend tax rates, then 
they should have higher PDRs, assuming the EG model is approximately correct.  This 
prediction of Proposition 5 is consistent with our positive estimates α̂ 1 for the HY 
dummy variable previously seen in Table 7.  However, we also regress PDRs on the 
















When the dividend yield itself is a parametric variable in the model to be estimated, it is 
possible that the results might be unduly influenced by several observations with 
unusually large yields D/Pcum.  Therefore, for this test only, we eliminate events where 
the dividend exceeds 10 percent of the cum-price.  This results in the loss of very few 
observations from our samples, since such large dividend yields are extremely rare.  Our 
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basic results are shown in Panel A of Table 9.  As expected, the relationship between 
PDRs and dividend yields is positive and significant in every case.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
While this evidence is certainly consistent with tax clienteles, a stronger case 
could be built if PDRs were most strongly related to D/P under the largest tax 
differentials |td – tcg|.  To gauge the strength of the PDR-dividend yield relationship, we 















 + εi .
Though relatively uncommon, there have been several historical instances of tax-rate 
changes that took effect in the middle of a year.22  When this occurs in the first half of the 
year (i.e. January to June), we perform that year’s regression with only the ex-dates 
occurring after the change.  Likewise, when the rate change occurs in the latter half of the 
year (i.e. July to December), we use only the ex-dates before the change.  This rule is 
designed to retain the maximum number of observations from each year while ensuring 
that the same tax rates are in effect for all dividends in each year’s regression.  To 
observe how the sensitivity of PDR to D/P depends on tax rates, we regress the 
previously obtained slope coefficients (which are mostly positive) on the absolute tax 
differential |td – tcg| using personal tax rates.  Specifically, we estimate 
T1α̂ = φ0 + φ1 |td – tcg|T,pers max + νT    and
T1α̂   =  φ0  +  φ1 |td – tcg|T,pers infl-adj   + νT
22 Mid-year tax rate changes occurred in March 1913, April 1951, November 1978, June 1981, May 1997, 
and May 2003.
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for each of our three samples.  As shown in Panel B of Table 9, estimates of φ1 are all 
positive.  The two CRSP estimates are both statistically significant, as is one of the Dow 
sample estimates.  It should be noted, however, that the other estimates φ̂ 1 are 
“insignificant” only because of high standard errors.  Their magnitudes (99.0566, 
57.9896, and 42.3868) are generally greater than the others (42.7606, 32.0807, and 
32.9573) that are deemed significant.  Therefore, our tests of Proposition 5 confirm that 
price drop ratios (PDRs) are higher for stocks with greater dividend yields, especially in 
the presence of larger differentials between dividend and capital gains tax rates.  This 
finding is strongly supportive of the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles. 
 
5.3.2 Testing Tax Timing Models of Ex-Dividend Price Behavior
The tax timing model developed in the previous chapter implies that ex-day price 
behavior depends partly on how the price of the stock has changed since the investor 
originally bought it.  Finding the right measure of “recent” price performance for our 
empirical tests presents a challenge since we do not know when current shareholders 
originally purchased the stock.  Therefore, we calculate %GAIN, the cumulative 
percentage change in the stock price, over (i) the past 45 trading days and (ii) the past 300 
trading days. The tax treatment of capital gains is admittedly different for these two 
cases. If the stock has been held for only 45 trading days, selling it now would trigger a 
short-term gain or loss.  If, however, the stock has been held for 300 trading days, the 
realized gains or losses are classified as long-term and are subject to a lower tax rate.
Nevertheless, the capital gains taxes that would result from closing a “winning” position 
should act as a deterrent to selling in all cases – especially in the first, where waiting 
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would provide the investor not only with a deferral but also with a lower rate tcg when the 
minimum holding period requirement is met.  Due to the additional data required to 
calculate %GAIN, all subsequent tests employ only the CRSP sample.  In addition, we 
eliminate observations when the total number of shares outstanding changes for any 
reason (e.g. due to a stock dividend or split) over the relevant gain measurement period.  
(For example, in regressions where %GAIN is calculated over the previous 300 trading 
days, we eliminate observations where the number of shares changes over that interval.)
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here]
As an initial test of Proposition 6, we estimate the models
























Our results in Table 10 support the prediction that PDRs should be directly related to 
accrued capital gains.  All coefficient estimates α̂ 1 are positive, and the ones calculated 
using 45-day gains are significant at the 1 percent level.  Those estimated from 300-day 
gains lack statistical significance; however, even they are more than one standard error 
greater than zero.  Table 11 presents our results from estimating similar models with 
market-adjusted returns as the dependent variable:

























In this case, all coefficient estimates γ̂ 1 are negative and significant, consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that MARs should be inversely related to past capital gains.  In both 
Tables 10 and 11, slope estimates α̂ 1 and γ̂ 1 are clearly largest when %GAIN is 
calculated over the past 45 days.  This suggests that very recent gains may play a larger 
role than longer-term gains in determining the extent of stockholders’ selling prior to an 
ex-date. By no means does this refute the classic EG model.  As was true in our tests of 
Propositions 1-5, there is still a significant relationship between the EG-implied tax 
variables and observed ex-dividend stock price behavior, as shown by the fact that all 
coefficient estimates α̂ 2 and γ̂ 2 from the above models are strongly positive and 
significant.  Therefore, ex-dividend stock price changes may be impacted both by long-
term investors who come to the market having already decided to sell for reasons 
unrelated to the dividend (e.g. wealth consumption, portfolio rebalancing) and by other 
individuals – some of whom have only recently purchased the stock – that might prefer to 
receive the dividend and postpone selling an appreciated stock.
So far, our results are supportive of the basic predictions of the tax timing model 
stated in Proposition 6.  However, a secondary prediction of the model is that the effect of 
recent stock price changes should be stronger (i) for stocks with lower dividend yields, 
and (ii) for stocks that have recently experience gains rather than losses.  To test this, we 
separate the previously defined HY and LY subsamples according to whether they have 
recently experienced positive or negative growth, thereby giving us four subsamples.  
Henceforth, the recent performance of a subgroup of stocks will be denoted with a “+” or 
“–” sign after the name of the group.  For example, “HY–” refers to the high-yield stocks 
that have recently declined in value, while “LY+” refers to the low-yield stocks that have 
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recently increased in value.  We then repeat each regression defined above on the four 
yield/performance groups separately.  
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Table 12 presents our results from regressions with the price drop ratio (PDR) as 
the dependent variable. Our ex ante prediction is that the coefficients α1 will be greater
for low-yield (LY) stocks and for those that have recently accumulated positive capital 
gains.  Our empirical results do not affirm this prediction.  In fact, slope estimates α̂ 1 are 
actually greatest in the “HY−” subgroup.  It is not immediately clear overall whether HY 
or LY stocks are affected more by past stock price changes.  Contrary to the theory, 
however, ex-dividend stock price behavior seems to be far more affected by recent losses
than by recent gains.  These results suggest that investors may actually be more inclined 
to sell stocks that have declined than they are to retain stocks whose values have climbed.  
This is not a prediction of the tax timing model derived in Chapter 4.
Our results in Table 13 for MARs complement those in Table 12 for PDRs.  
Consistent with Proposition 6, MARs are in most cases negatively related to prior returns.  
While this is consistent with theory, the fact that γ̂ 1 estimates are most negative in the 
“HY−” subgroup and only weakly so among “LY+” stocks is very difficult to reconcile 
with the tax timing model.
[Insert Tables 13-14 about here]
Table 14 presents our results from estimating the models



























This is a more formal test of how the sensitivity of 
D
P*∆
 to %GAIN varies by dividend 
yield.  A non-interacting dummy variable HY is included in the regression to control for 
differences in the average levels of PDRs between high- and low-yield stocks.  As in 
Table 10, our slope estimates for the variable %GAIN are all positive and are significant 
at the 1 percent level when gains are calculated over the past 45 days or over the current 
calendar year.  All of the estimates α̂ 3 for the interaction term HY × %GAIN are also 
positive; however, they are significant only with 45-day gains.  These results indicate that 
PDRs are positively related to accrued capital gains for both HY and LY stocks, but 
(contrary to Proposition 6) especially so for HY stocks.
[Insert Table 15 about here]
We also estimate the equivalent models using market-adjusted returns (MARs) as 
the dependent variable, as given by



























As shown in Table 15, all of the estimates γ̂ 2 and γ̂ 3 are negative and significant – more
notably when %GAIN is calculated over the past 45 days.  This confirms our findings in 
Table 14 that the ex-day anomaly is smaller when there has been a recent price run-up, 
and that the sensitivity of ex-day returns to recent gains is stronger for HY instead of LY 
stocks.
We have already deduced by inspecting Tables 12 and 13 that capital losses affect 
ex-dividend stock price behavior to a greater extent than capital gains.  However, to test 
this conclusion formally, we estimate the following models for price drop ratios:
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[Insert Table 16 about here]
The dummy variable POSi equals 1 when %GAINi > 0, and zero otherwise.  As shown in 
Table 16, when %GAIN is calculated over 45 days, α̂ 1 is again significantly positive.  
However, the interaction term slope α2 is also estimated to be strongly negative, 
confirming that the sensitivity of PDR to %GAIN is much weaker for stocks that have 
experienced recent gains than for those that have suffered losses.  The models for market-
adjusted returns are similar:
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[Insert Table 17 about here]
Consistent with our earlier findings, Table 17 shows that γ̂ 1 is always significantly 
negative, while all estimates γ̂ 2 are significantly positive with approximately the same 
magnitude as their respective corresponding γ1 estimates.  Since (γ1 + γ2) is the sensitivity 
of MAR to %GAIN for stocks whose prices have increased, the conclusion drawn from 
this particular test is that market-adjusted ex-day returns on average are negatively 
affected by recently accrued capital losses but are virtually unaffected by positive accrued 
gains.  As discussed previously, this is contrary to the prediction of Proposition 6.
Although rational investors should be mindful of the tax consequences of their 
decisions at all times, it is possible that they might be more so in the last quarter of the 
year (and by extension, less so in the first three).  To determine whether sensitivity of 
PDR to accrued gains is stronger in the last three months of the calendar year, we define a 
dummy variable LASTQTR, which equals 1 if the ex-date in question occurs in October, 
November, or December, and zero otherwise.  Using price drop ratios (PDRs) as our 
dependent variable, we estimate the following regression models:
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[Insert Table 18 about here]
Our results (shown in Table 18) are somewhat surprising.  We expected that all estimates 
of α2 would be positive if they were significant at all.  Instead, we find that α̂ 2 is 
negative in every case, although not statistically significant.  The results from the models
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[Insert Table 19 about here]
are no less puzzling.  We expected γ1 and γ2 to be negative, but in fact, two of the 
estimates γ̂ 2 are positive and significant.  Intuition suggests that the effect of recent 
capital gains should be stronger toward the end of the year, not only because investors 
are more prone to pay attention to taxes then, but also because investors’ motivation to 
delay the sale of an appreciated stock should be strengthened by the fact that a relatively
short wait (≤ 3 months) could push the capital gains completely into the next tax year.  
Thus, our empirical results are at odds with the spirit of the tax timing model and the 
behavioral arguments for Proposition 7.
[Insert Table 20 about here]
Finally, we test the implication of Proposition 8 that investors’ trading decisions 
around ex-dates are influenced by anticipated future tax rate changes.  To accomplish 
this, we estimate the models
PDRi = α0 + α1 %GAINi + α2 (∆tcg)i,pers max + εi    and
PDRi = α0 + α1 %GAINi  + α2 (∆tcg)i,pers infl-adj + εi .
We define ∆tcg as the future change in the capital gains tax rate if a change occurs within 
the six months following the ex-date; if no change in tcg occurs during this period, ∆tcg is 
set to zero.  As always, regressions are estimated separately using personal tax rates on 
the highest bracket and rates on a constant inflation-adjusted income.  The interval of six 
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months is selected because it is an approximation of how far in advance investors may 
begin anticipating a rate change with reasonable accuracy.  The motivation to sell prior to 
the ex-date to avoid higher dividend taxes (per the usual tax explanation) should be 
strengthened by an impending increase in tcg, particularly if there is a large accrued
capital gain.  This would arguably reduce PDRs, so we expect estimates of α2 to be 
negative.  As shown in Table 20, this is true in every case, although the estimates are 
statistically significant only when %GAIN is calculated over 45 days.  We also estimate 
the same models using MAR as the dependent variable, as shown below:
MAR exi  =  γ0 +  γ1 %GAINi + γ2 (∆tcg)i,pers max + εi    and
MAR exi  =  γ0 +  γ1 %GAINi  + γ2 (∆tcg)i,pers infl-adj + εi .
[Insert Table 21 about here]
Proposition 8 predicts that ex-day returns should be higher preceding an anticipated 
increase in tcg.  Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 21 shows that all estimates γ̂ 2 are 
positive.  As in Table 20 where PDRs were used to quantify ex-dividend price behavior, 
only two of the four estimates have statistical significance.  However, the others do have 
the theorized positive sign and are more than one standard error from zero.  Therefore, 
the evidence is consistent with the idea that an impending increase in the capital gains 
rate enhances investors’ motive to sell a stock before it goes ex-dividend, thereby 




Since Elton and Gruber’s (EG 1970) seminal work, it has been well known that 
stock prices do not on average drop by the full amount of the dividend on the ex-date.  
Although this anomaly has generated considerable interest among researchers for over 
three decades, there has been no clear consensus about why the ex-day effect exists.  The 
oldest and best-known explanation, proposed and tested by EG themselves, is that the 
price cannot fall by the entire dividend amount because many investors are taxed at the 
full ordinary rate on dividends but enjoy a lower rate on capital gains.  In such a situation, 
if the price drop were equal to the dividend, no rational investor would choose to sell the 
stock just after it goes ex-dividend when doing so would effectively convert capital gains 
to ordinary income dollar-for-dollar.  To restore equilibrium so that investors are 
indifferent between selling just before and just after the ex-date, the ratio of the stock 
price to dividend must be given by 









which is less than 1 when td > tcg.  Consistent with the Miller-Modigliani (1961) concept 
of dividend clienteles, EG go on to hypothesize that stocks with higher dividend yields 
will attract investors with relatively low dividend tax rates (who therefore have a 
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comparative advantage receiving dividend income).  Therefore, high-yield stocks are 
likely to have higher price drop ratios (PDRs) than low-yield stocks.
Like all models, the one from which the EG formula is derived is an 
oversimplification of reality.  Not everyone is subject to the same tax rates td and tcg.  
Short-term traders are taxed equally on dividends and capital gains and therefore are 
indifferent between the two types of income.  Corporations generally receive tax breaks 
on dividends instead of capital gains.  Depending on the relative influence of these 
different classes of investors, the PDR might be equal to or even greater than 1.  In 
addition, various other constraints might impact observed ex-dividend stock price 
behavior.  Bali and Hite (1998) note that stock prices historically have been constrained 
to multiples of $1/8 and derive a model showing how such discreteness restrictions can 
give rise to an ex-day price drop that is less than the dividend.  While these alternative 
theories may have merit, testing them is beyond the scope of this study.  The purpose of 
this dissertation has been to test tax-related models of ex-dividend stock price behavior.
The first half of our empirical analysis is devoted to testing whether observed ex-
dividend stock price behavior is consistent with the EG model and tax-based dividend 
clienteles.  Ours is certainly not the first paper to do so.  A great number of authors have 
examined whether this phenomenon intensifies, weakens, or even completely vanishes 
around key tax law changes (both in the U.S. and abroad) as EG suggest it should.  Some
papers have even considered multiple tax law changes.  However, this study is the first to
incorporate all of the relevant tax rate changes over a long sample period and actually test 
whether individually observed PDRs for the whole sample vary systematically through 







.  While this would be an important 
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contribution to the literature by itself, we also employ a sample that includes ex-dividend 
dates for stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1910 to 2003.  All of our 
hypotheses are tested on the CRSP daily database, which extends back only to 1962.  
However, we also test the EG model on this “Dow” sample, which spans nearly an entire 
century.  The pre-1962 period has never been examined by any prior study because it is 
not included in the CRSP daily database; nevertheless, it saw the largest differentials 
between dividend and capital gains tax rates in history and is therefore an interesting 
focus of potential research on ex-dividend stock pricing.







 when td and tcg are the personal dividend and capital gains tax rates.  When 
corporate tax rates are used, however, the relationship is opposite to the one 
hypothesized.
Price drops that are less than the dividend also cause stock returns to be higher 
than usual on ex-days.  Eades, Hess, and Kim (EHK 1984) show that ex-day stock returns 







.  Our research confirms that this 
relationship holds in the expected direction when personal tax rates are used but in the 
opposite direction when corporate rates are used.  We also note that the ex-day effect is 
weaker, as evidenced by higher PDRs and lower MARs, when a longer holding period is 
required to receive the capital gains tax break.
Our results do not vary greatly depending on whether a stock is high-yield (HY) 
or low-yield (LY).  Specifically, PDRs and MARs in the HY subsample are not related to 
the hypothesized corporate tax variables as initially predicted.  However, this is actually 
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consistent with the argument that corporate dividend capture was much more difficult 
prior to the introduction of negotiable commissions in 1975 and did not exert a great 
influence on stock prices until then.
We also confirm another important EG prediction in all our samples –
specifically, that PDRs are positively related to dividend yields.  However, our tests go a 
step further, documenting that the strength of this relationship is greater when the tax 
differential between td and tcg is wider.
The second half of our analysis is devoted to testing a newly derived extension of 
the EG model, which we call the tax timing model.  In the basic EG framework, we 
would argue that the ex-day phenomenon exists because shareholders would have a clear 
incentive to sell a stock before it goes ex-dividend if ∆P were equal to D.  However, the 
presence of a large accrued capital gain might act to counter that incentive since selling 
would force the investor to recognize and pay taxes on the capital gain that otherwise 
could have been delayed.  Consistent with this idea, we do find that the ex-day effect is 
weaker (i.e. PDRs are higher and MARs are lower) when the stock has recently 
experienced better returns.  However, we also find that the relationship between the ex-
day effect and past returns is stronger in the HY subsamples and in stocks that have 
recently experienced negative instead of positive returns.  These findings are contrary to 
the predictions of the tax timing model.  Nevertheless, our tests show that recent capital 
gains do affect ex-dividend price behavior.  This has potentially important implications 
for previously published empirical tests of the ex-day anomaly, as we know of no such 
study that controls for prior returns.
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Finally, we relate ex-dividend price changes to anticipated future tax rates on 
capital gains.  We argue that investors are able to predict with reasonable accuracy the 
timing, direction, and magnitude of future changes in the capital gains rate.  If an ex-date 
were to occur in the months preceding an increase in the capital gains tax rate, and if 
stockholders anticipated the change, they might have an additional incentive (i.e. 
recognizing the gain before the tax rate hike) to sell.  Our results do suggest that the ex-
day effect is stronger (i.e. PDRs are lower and MARs are higher) prior to an increase in 
the personal capital gains tax rate.
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several important ways.  Many 
previous works recognize that tax law changes should have an impact on ex-dividend 
stock price behavior if EG are correct.  However, most of them have employed rather 
limited sample periods.  This is the first study to relate observed ex-day pricing to the 
actual tax rates td and tcg in effect over the entirety of a broad sample period.  We also use 
a longer sample period than any other study in the literature – extending from the present 
day back to the inception of the Federal Income Tax.  This is especially interesting since 
rather large tax differentials existed in the 1940s and 1950s, but most other studies of the 
ex-day anomaly examine only data subsequent to 1962.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature by recognizing another factor (i.e. 
recently stock price performance) that systematically influences tax-motivated trading 
around ex-dividend dates.  Our study is the first to develop a theoretical model 
demonstrating why recent stock price appreciation should weaken the ex-day 
phenomenon and to provide empirical evidence validating this model’s basic prediction. 
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Despite these contributions, much remains to be investigated.  Our results provide 
strong evidence that individual tax rates impact price drop ratios and market-adjusted 
returns.  Therefore, it follows that individual investors do have some influence at the 
margin over ex-dividend stock price behavior.  However, we hope that future studies are
able to provide more direct evidence on which investors impact prices around the ex-day 
and what their motivations for trading may be.
We have also developed a new model predicting that there should be a 
relationship between ex-dividend stock price behavior and past stock price changes.  
While we have confirmed the model’s basic prediction, we have not been able to explain 
why past gains seem to matter more for high-yield stocks and for stocks that have 
recently suffered losses.  Perhaps a more generalized tax timing model could be 
developed that better accounts for the relationship between the ex-day effect and past 
performance.
Finally, we have purposely limited the scope of this study to testing tax-related 
explanations for the ex-day effect.  Nevertheless, there are a host of other possibilities 
worth considering.  Previous work has established that transaction costs can impact the 
magnitude of ex-dividend price drops.  Furthermore, there are also a number of 
microstructure considerations (e.g. bid-ask spreads, exchange rules for ex-day order 
adjustment, and price discreteness imposed by tick sizes and quote clustering) that are not 
yet fully understood. We therefore leave it to future research to enhance our 
understanding of how taxes affect ex-dividend stock price behavior and to evaluate 
alternative factors that may operate alongside tax effects.
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Figure 1
Sample Period of this Study Compared with Other Works on Tax Law Changes
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Price Drop Ratios Implied by Top Individual Dividend and Capital Gain Rates




























































Price Drop Ratios Implied by Top Corporate Dividend and Capital Gain Rates
Panel A:  Dividend capture strategy




























































Price Drop Ratios Implied by Top Corporate Dividend and Capital Gain Rates
Panel B:  Long-term investment strategy




























































Price Drop Ratios and Ex-Day Returns Implied by EG and Tax Timing Models
(P0 = $80, P














































Tax Timing Model: Effect of Original Purchase Price (P0) on Ex-Day Price Drop
Panel A: Different Dividend Yields (D/Pcum)















































Tax Timing Model: Effect of Original Purchase Price (P0) on Ex-Day Price Drop
Panel B: Different Reinvestment Periods (τ)

















































Relationship of Observed Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Hypothesized Values
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003. Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR),
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The dependent variable for all regressions is the price drop 
ratio (PDR), calculated as ∆P*/D.






























F 32.11 *** 0.87 3.89 **






















F 31.19 *** 10.02 *** 1.42






















F 36.51 *** 3.70 * 2.18
R2 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 2
Relationship of Observed Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Hypothesized 
Values
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), 
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The dependent variable for all regressions is the market-
adjusted return (MAR), calculated as (D − ∆P*)/Pcum.






























F 59.66 *** 1.14 11.78 ***























F 78.24 *** 16.87 *** 10.14 ***






















F 77.48 *** 5.02 ** 14.31 ***
R2 0.0004 0.0005 0.0031
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 3
Impact of Personal Capital Gains Holding Periods on Observed Price Drop Ratios 
(PDRs)
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  CGHOLD is the number 
of months a stock must be held to qualify for the personal capital gains tax rate tcg.  Observations are 
deleted if (i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less 
than 4 trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less 
than $1, (v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the 
ex-day, (vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates, or (vii) 
CGHOLD is undefined because short-term and long-term gains are taxed identically an ex-date.  The 
price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is 
adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price 
drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The dependent variable for all regressions 
is the price drop ratio (PDR), calculated as ∆P*/D.




































F 24.87 *** 5.35 *** 1.97





























F 31.80 *** 4.16 ** 2.03
R2 0.0003 0.0010 0.0010 
 
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 4
Impact of Personal Capital Gains Holding Periods on Observed Market-Adjusted 
Returns (MARs)
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  CGHOLD is the number 
of months a stock must be held to qualify for the personal capital gains tax rate tcg.  Observations are 
deleted if (i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less 
than 4 trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less 
than $1, (v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the 
ex-day, (vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates, or (vii) 
CGHOLD is undefined because short-term and long-term gains are taxed identically an ex-date.  The 
price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is 
adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price 
drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The dependent variable for all regressions 
is the market-adjusted return (MAR), calculated as (D − ∆P*)/Pcum.




































F 36.32 *** 7.19 *** 7.20 ***




























F 56.45 *** 11.06 *** 8.18 ***
R2 0.0006 0.0027 0.0039
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 5
Relationship of Observed Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Hypothesized Values by 
Dividend Yield
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), 
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  Observations are ranked quarterly by D/Pcum and are classified 
as high-yield (HY) if they fall in the top 20% or low-yield (LY) if they fall in the bottom 80%. The 
dependent variable for all regressions is the price drop ratio (PDR), calculated as ∆P*/D.
Panel A – High-Yield (HY) Stocks






























F 31.22 *** 1.83 0.33






















F 29.81 *** 2.56 0.17






















F 29.81 *** 0.16 0.11
R2 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 5 (continued)
Relationship of Observed Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Hypothesized Values by 
Dividend Yield
Panel B – Low-Yield (LY) Stocks






























F 23.26 *** 1.85 4.97 **






















F 22.71 *** 10.59 *** 2.98 *






















F 27.24 *** 4.47 ** 3.25 *
R2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0009
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 6
Relationship of Observed Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Hypothesized 
Values by Dividend Yield
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), 
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  Observations are ranked quarterly by D/Pcum and are classified 
as high-yield (HY) if they fall in the top 20% or low-yield (LY) if they fall in the bottom 80%.  The 
dependent variable for all regressions is the market-adjusted return (MAR), calculated as (D − ∆P*)/Pcum.
Panel A – High-Yield (HY) Stocks






























F 20.34 *** 0.99 0.14






















F 21.91 *** 4.60 ** 0.07






















F 17.66 *** 0.78 0.02
R2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 6 (continued)
Relationship of Observed Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Hypothesized 
Values by Dividend Yield
Panel B – Low-Yield (LY) Stocks






























F 40.04 *** 3.15 * 16.68 ***






















F 56.45 *** 14.60 *** 13.70 ***






















F 59.52 *** 5.13 ** 18.19 ***
R2 0.0004 0.0007 0.0050
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 7
Relationship of Observed Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Hypothesized Values with 
High-Yield (HY) Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), 
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  HY equals 1 if the observation falls in the top 20% of 
dividends (ranked quarterly by D/Pcum) and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for all regressions is 
the price drop ratio (PDR), calculated as ∆P*/D.



















































F 17.64 *** 6.45 *** 3.47 **











































F 17.36 *** 9.93 *** 2.66 **
R2 0.0003 0.0032 
 
0.0017
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
111
Table 8
Relationship of Observed Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Hypothesized 
Values with High-Yield (HY) Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates.  The price drop ∆P* is 
the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the 
realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), 
and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  HY equals 1 if the observation falls in the top 20% of 
dividends (ranked quarterly by D/Pcum) and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for all regressions is 
the market-adjusted return (MAR), calculated as (D − ∆P*)/Pcum.


















































F 22.97 *** 4.35 *** 5.48 ***











































F 28.87 *** 9.43 *** 4.51 ***
R2 0.0004 0.0031 0.0030
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 9
Impact of Tax Differential on Sensitivity of Price Drop Ratios to Dividend Yields
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends by NYSE/AMEX-listed domestic corporations 
with ex-dates from 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  The Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends from 
1/1/1910 to 12/31/2003 for companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-
1962 Dow sample includes Dow dividends from 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if (i) 
any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s prior ex-date, (iii) D < $0.01, (iv) Pcum or Pex is less than $1, (v) the stock is 
untraded over trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where 0 is the ex-day, (vi) there is a change in shares 
outstanding between the cum- and ex-dates, or (vii) D/Pcum > 0.10.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price 
over [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the market return.  Each sample 
is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  In Panel A, regressions 
are estimated for the entire sample.  In Panel B, PDR is regressed on D/Pcum separately for each year 
(excluding some of the dividends in years with mid-year tax changes), and the resulting slope estimates 
are regressed on |td – tcg|. 
Panel A – Dependent Variable: Price Drop Ratio (PDR)





















F 2.94 * 40.35 *** 12.21 ***
R2 0.0000 0.0044 0.0027
Panel B – Dependent Variable: Sensitivity of PDR to Dividend Yield





















F 5.27 ** 3.25 * 2.73













F 3.08 * 2.17 0.17
R2 0.0716 0.0231 0.0043
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 10
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The 























































F 54.08 *** 5.95 ***
R2 0.0008 0.0004
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 11
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The 





























F 120.22 *** 15.23 ***























F 131.92 *** 14.21 ***
R2 0.0019 0.0009
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 12
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains by Dividend 
Yield and Gain/Loss Classification
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  
Observations are ranked quarterly by D/Pcum and are classified as high-yield (HY) if they fall in the top 
20% or low-yield (LY) if they fall in the bottom 80%.  Observations are also classified as having 
positive (+) or negative (−) recent performance depending on the sign of %GAIN.  The dependent 
variable for all regressions is the price drop ratio (PDR), calculated as ∆P*/D.




















































F 8.42 *** 3.07 **
R2 0.0011 0.0015
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 12 (continued)
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains by Dividend 
Yield and Gain/Loss Classification




















































F 16.91 *** 1.64
R2 0.0006 0.0002
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 12 (continued)
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains by Dividend 
Yield and Gain/Loss Classification




















































F 44.57 *** 10.43 ***
R2 0.0062 0.0045
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 12 (continued)
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains by Dividend 
Yield and Gain/Loss Classification





















































F 19.04 *** 6.30 ***
R2 0.0008 0.0013
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 13
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains by 
Dividend Yield and Gain/Loss Classification
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  
Observations are ranked quarterly by D/Pcum and are classified as high-yield (HY) if they fall in the top 
20% or low-yield (LY) if they fall in the bottom 80%.  Observations are also classified as having 
positive (+) or negative (−) recent performance depending on the sign of %GAIN.  The dependent 
variable for all regressions is the market-adjusted return (MAR), calculated as (D − ∆P*)/Pcum.








Intercept        0.000306 
      (0.000394)
−0.001583 *
      (0.000872)
%GAIN −0.006483 ***
      (0.001874)












      (0.000729)
       0.003114 **
      (0.001560)
F 6.00 *** 2.50 *
R2 0.0008    0.0012
Intercept        0.000139 




      (0.001879)
       0.001041 










−        0.000603 
      (0.001327)
       0.005470 *
      (0.003019)
F 6.10 *** 2.14
R2 0.0008  0.0010 
 
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 13 (continued)
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains by 
Dividend Yield and Gain/Loss Classification








Intercept        0.000780 ***
      (0.000196)
       0.000252 
      (0.000634)
%GAIN −0.001389 **
      (0.000638)
−0.000732 *










−        0.001169 ***
      (0.000354)
       0.001825 *
      (0.001097)
F        7.69 *** 3.20 **
R2        0.0003 0.0005
Intercept        0.000510 **
      (0.000208)
       0.001111 
      (0.000685)
%GAIN −0.001601 **












−        0.002957 ***
      (0.000647)
       0.000379 
      (0.002111)
F      12.68 *** 1.83
R2        0.0004        0.0003
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 13 (continued)
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains by 
Dividend Yield and Gain/Loss Classification








Intercept −0.001412 *** 
      (0.000482)
       0.000191  
      (0.001266)
%GAIN −0.02494 ***
      (0.002448)
−0.01308 ***










−        0.005045 ***
      (0.000869)
−0.000010 
      (0.002160)
F      66.75 ***      16.75 ***
R2        0.0093        0.0071
Intercept −0.001662 ***
      (0.000514)
−0.000725 
      (0.001287)
%GAIN −0.02413 ***
      (0.002447)
−0.01282 ***










−        0.009298 ***
      (0.001584)
     0.003200 
      (0.004013)
F      67.11 ***      17.07 ***
R2        0.0094        0.0073
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 13 (continued)
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains by 
Dividend Yield and Gain/Loss Classification







N = 9,672 
 
Intercept −0.000037 
      (0.000251)
−0.001077 
      (0.000984)
%GAIN −0.009031 ***
      (0.001167)
−0.001699 










−        0.002387 ***
      (0.000450)
       0.003822 **
      (0.001707)
F        43.99 *** 3.24 ***
R2        0.0018 0.0007
Intercept −0.000140 
      (0.000267)
−0.000963 
      (0.001011)
%GAIN −0.008706 ***
      (0.001169)
−0.001387 










−        0.004319 ***
      (0.000816)
       0.006188 **
      (0.003032)
F        43.94 ***    2.81 *
R2    0.0018        0.0006
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
123
Table 14
Relationship of PDRs to Recent Gains with High-Yield (HY) Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed domestic 
corporations with ex-dates from 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  The Dow sample includes all taxable cash 
dividends from 1/1/1910 to 12/31/2003 for firms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  
The Post-1962 Dow sample includes Dow dividends from 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  Observations are 
deleted if (i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less 
than 4 trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D < $0.01, (iv), Pcum or Pex < $1, (v) the stock 
is untraded over the interval [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where 0 is the ex-day, or (vi) there is a change in shares 
outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  %GAIN is the cumulative percentage 
increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous period preceding the ex-date.  The 
price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first closing price over [0,+5] and is 
adjusted for the market.  Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% 
are trimmed.  HY equals 1 if the observation falls in the top 20% of dividends (ranked quarterly by 




































































F 32.89 *** 3.55 ***
R2 0.0010 0.0004
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 15
Relationship of MARs to Recent Gains with High -Yield (HY) Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes taxable cash dividends for NYSE/AMEX-listed domestic corporations with 
ex-dates 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  The Dow sample includes taxable cash dividends with from 1/1/1910 
to 12/31/2003 for firms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample 
includes Dow dividends from 7/2/1962 to 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if (i) any other type of 
distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 trading days after the 
firm’s prior ex-date, (iii) D < $0.01, (iv), Pcum or Pex < $1, (v) the stock is untraded over [-6,-1] or [0,+5], 
where 0 is the ex-day, or (vi) there is a change in shares outstanding during the period over which 
%GAIN is calculated.  %GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45 or 
300 trading days before the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over [-6,-1] minus the first
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the market.  Each sample is sorted by ∆P*/D, and the upper 
and lower 1% are trimmed.  HY equals 1 if the observation falls in the top 20% of dividends (ranked 




































































F 101.93 *** 12.40 ***
R2 0.0030 0.0015
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 16
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains with Dummy 
Variable for Positive Gains
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  POS equals 
1 if %GAIN > 0, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for all regressions is the price drop ratio 































































F 39.02 *** 4.17 ***
R2 0.0008 0.0004
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 17
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains with 
Dummy Variable for Positive Gains
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  POS equals 
1 if %GAIN > 0, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for all regressions is the market-adjusted 




























































F 112.05 *** 13.66 ***
R2 0.0024 0.0013
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 18
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Recent Capital Gains with Last 
Quarter Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  LASTQTR 
equals 1 if the ex-day occurs between October 1 and December 31, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent 



































































F 36.10 *** 4.31 ***
R2 0.0008 0.0004
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 19
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Recent Capital Gains with 
Last Quarter Dummy Variable
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  LASTQTR 
equals 1 if the ex-day occurs between October 1 and December 31, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent 
































































F 87.99 *** 11.29 ***
R2 0.0019 0.0011
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 20
Relationship of Price Drop Ratios (PDRs) to Future Changes in the Capital Gains 
Tax Rate
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  ∆tcg is defined as the difference between tcg six months after the ex-date 
and the current value of tcg.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (PDR), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The 


































F 37.99 *** 1.15
R2 0.0006 0.0001
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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Table 21
Relationship of Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) to Future Changes in the Capital 
Gains Tax Rate
The CRSP sample includes all taxable cash dividends (code 12N2) paid by NYSE/AMEX-listed 
domestic corporations (share type codes 10-11) with ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  The 
Dow sample includes all taxable cash dividends with ex-dates between 1/1/1910 and 12/31/2003 for 
companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the ex-date.  The Post-1962 Dow sample includes 
dividends in the Dow sample for ex-dates between 7/2/1962 and 12/31/2003.  Observations are deleted if 
(i) any other type of distribution by the same firm has the same ex-date, (ii) the ex-date is less than 4 
trading days after the firm’s previous ex-date, (iii) D is less than 1 cent, (iv), Pcum or Pex is less than $1, 
(v) the stock is untraded over the interval of trading days [-6,-1] or [0,+5], where day 0 is the ex-day, or 
(vi) there is a change in total shares outstanding during the period over which %GAIN is calculated.  
%GAIN is the cumulative percentage increase in the stock price over the 45-day or 300-day continuous 
period preceding the ex-date.  ∆tcg is defined as the difference between tcg six months after the ex-date 
and the current value of tcg.  The price drop ∆P* is the last price over the interval [-6,-1] minus the first 
closing price over [0,+5] and is adjusted for the realized market return over the corresponding day(s).  
Each sample is sorted by price drop ratio (∆P*/D), and the upper and lower 1% are trimmed.  The 


































F 95.36 *** 10.55 ***
R2 0.0014 0.0007
*, **, or *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  Parameters and 
their associated standard errors (shown in parentheses) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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as expected when td and tcg are the tax rates 
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Finally, the results confirm that PDRs and MARs are related to future changes in 
tcg as hypothesized.
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